

on the basis of monetary theories of crises and with purely descriptive, statistical methods. The favorable or unfavorable market for securities, and the consequent increase and useability of capital are evidently not dependent upon the structure of the monetary mechanism but on the fluctuating prospects of the profitability of industry. But Ayres does not tell us what causes these fluctuations.

HENRYK GROSSMAN (New York).

Beals, Carleton, *The Coming Struggle for Latin America*, J. B. Lippincott Company, New York 1938. (401 pp.; \$3.00)

Aikman, Duncan, *The All-American Front*, Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., New York 1940. (344 pp.; \$3.00)

Carr, Katherine, *South American Primer*, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York 1939. (208 pp.; \$1.75)

Three different kinds of approach are discernible among books on Latin America. The first is a mere journalistic treatment of the problem. The second is an attempt to evaluate the economic and historical background but is marred by a misunderstanding of the dominant forces in Latin American society, the manifestations of which are taken seriously at their face value without distinguishing between ideology and demagogy on the one hand and cold blooded political and business strategy on the other. The third is realistic research which is not subject to exaggeration and which takes into account the critical evaluation of available data.

Carleton Beals' fascinating book is typical of the first kind of approach. Beals' aim is to show how Latin America is about to become the next object of fascist expansion, how Japanese, German, Italian and (Franco-) Spanish influence—in some cases even domination—is growing, how the British and American interests are trying to hold their positions or to gain new ones, how the Good Neighbor policy is understood—and sometimes distrusted—by the Latin American peoples and what should be done in order not to alienate the newly acquired friendly feelings towards the United States. He describes the possibilities of a joint defense of the Western Hemisphere against "totalitarian" interference and outlines the mistakes American "Dollar-Diplomacy" is said to have made. He underlines his warnings with a wealth of material which certainly is not to be found in official reports, and which usually has not even been published in the American press.

However, this reviewer confesses his surprise at learning that in recent years Argentina has had a totalitarian régime under President Ortiz (320), with imperialistic aims (316), almost on the point of invading Brazil (321), and must confess that he was entirely unaware of these sinister facts. It is generally admitted, even by the Conservative Argentine press, that the election of Ortiz was a manipulated one. But fraudulent elections are typical of Latin American history, and even a very fraudulent election does not by itself necessarily mean a totalitarian régime. One of the chief features of such a régime would be the suppression of civil liberties, especially of the freedom of the press, but it is evident from the Argentine newspapers that this is not the case in Argentina. Nor should one take seriously the rumours of Argentina's imperialist aims toward Brazil. It is true that there was formerly a certain amount of jealousy between Argentina and Brazil, but

relations have never been better than they now are between the Ortiz and Vargas administrations.

There are also many minor points which suffer from lack of adequate care. Many of the names are misspelled and some statements are confused. Thus, the former ruling coalition in Argentina was the "Concordancia," not the "Concordia" (319), the fascist ex-governor of Buenos Aires Province was Fresco, not Fresno (103, 154). The Argentine system of exchange control was not initiated by Ortiz (321) but many years before him, by Hueyo, Minister of Finance under General Justo. The huge operation of the refunding of the national debt and the establishment of the new governmental Central Bank (321) was not the work of Ortiz, but was conceived and carried out by his predecessor, Minister of Finance Pinedo, under General Justo. The "buy from them who buy from us" policy (321) was also not originated by Ortiz, but is to be ascribed to Pinedo and to his able Central Bank manager, Raúl Prebisch. In spite of these shortcomings Mr. Beals gives the reader a vivid impression of Latin-American problems.

Duncan Aikman's study comes under the second category of books on Latin America. His facts are more carefully selected and he distinguishes between gossip and reliable information. But although he does not deny the influence of economic factors upon Latin American politics, he uses an approach which could perhaps best be termed historical romanticism. For Aikman, Latin American politics are not so much to be explained as the result of competition between German, Italian, British and American vested interests, but rather in such terms as "national dignity," "prestige" and "yearning for dominance." This yearning for dominance is for him "a primary stimulus . . . an explanation for practically the whole range of Latin American social action" (89). Significant of his approach is the explanation he offers for the changes in the customs and exchange regulations which Argentina decreed a week after the Lima conference of 1938, and which drastically curtailed imports from the United States. According to him these measures were not so much caused by Argentina's precarious exchange situation, but by the fact that Argentina's delegates at Lima had to yield too much to Secretary Hull's wishes in the shaping of the final "Declaration of Lima." That, says Aikman, "was a Yankee triumph, and to a republic proud of never yielding to Washington on issues, painfully compromising. Such a stain could be wiped out only by an equal and opposite anti-United States counterstroke. So the politicians in Buenos Aires, totaling up their list of other grievances, did a little consciously dramatic timing. Within a week the counterstroke came." Thus, Aikman thinks, "Argentina had thrown off the stigma of the Lima concession and proved once more that she was free from the imperialistic influence of the northern colossus" (125). That is the romantic approach. Aikman should have made a closer examination of the Argentine exchange and import situation of that time, as well as of the status of the trade-treaty negotiations, and he would have found that the curtailing of imports to be paid for with "free market" exchange was at that time unavoidable and had nothing at all to do with the supposed moral defeat at Lima, in which nobody in Argentina was in any case interested.

Aikman fails to see that what he generally deems to be the real cause of actions in Latin American politics is very often nothing but the camouflage of a clash between foreign vested interests. Aikman has a wrong

conception of German and Italian fascism. For him it was "intense national hatreds and war fears which have led great nations to fly off into dictator worship as a refuge from greater terrors . . . the overcrowding of people which leads to the desperate tensions of hate for 'living room's' sake" (210), whereas fascism can be better explained in sober, unromantic terms of the inability of the previous political setup to deal with the growing class antagonism. For someone who is unable to understand fascism in any other way but with the use of such ideological slogans as hatred, fear and jealousy, Latin American politics may really look like "touchy nationalisms . . . (which) will flare into tantrums of patriotic jealousy" (167).

On the other hand, Aikman may be commended for his serious endeavour not to exaggerate in his description of characteristic details of Latin American politics. For Argentina, for example, he recognizes that, even under Ortiz' régime, "the press is undoubtedly free, except in grave—and usually brief—periods of disturbances. Furious political activities against the government are permitted" (194), and one may agree with him when he describes the situation of Argentina as "a modified democracy, flavored with a Chinaman's chance for overwhelming opposition majorities" (194).

The third kind of approach to Latin American problems is best represented by Katherine Carr's little book. She "wanted a book that would tell what . . . the ten South American nations . . . were like. I wanted to know about the South American people, and the way they lived, and why they lived that way." After a short but accurate historical introduction dealing with the fate of South America from its discovery through the Spanish Viceroy to the present day republics and their governments, the book gives the principal facts about each of the constituent countries, without bias and without overlooking the rôle the foreign vested interests and their native henchmen used to play. The author correctly shows how the ruling large landowners, sometimes against, but generally hand in glove with the foreign interests, exert their influence upon the governments; how they prefer to rule democratically, as long as their preponderance is not endangered; and how and why they resort to military dictatorships, whenever they feel that (their) "law and order" would be jeopardized by permitting really free elections.

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