EGOISM AND THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT: ON THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE BOURGEOIS ERA*

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I

The contradiction in the conception of human nature that has outstanding significance in the political literature of the bourgeois era came to light in two brilliant works at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Although Machiavelli's instructions for statesmen are not based on as pessimistic an anthropology as implied by the familiar statement in Chapter 18 of *The Prince* that all men "are bad and would not observe their faith,"[1] subsequent centuries understood him essentially in that manner. In fact, Machiavelli found so many followers in this direction that Treitschke could state that "all truly great political thinkers reveal a trace of cynical contempt for man, and even if it is not too strong it always has a strong basis."[2] Thomas More's *Utopia* expresses a different view. This vision of a rational society proclaims the conviction of an originally happier constitution of human nature by the mere fact that its realization, according to the fable, is separated from the present not temporally but only spatially. References to man's bestial instincts do not lead more to limit the duration of the association of free men who regulate their lives according to plans that respect the claims of each member equally. Unlike Machiavelli, More does not describe a cycle of state forms in which every tolerable condition is necessarily followed by the same confusion and misery out of which society has emerged by arduous process. [3] Nor was More the only one to hold this view. In his fight against the Hobbesian doctrine on human nature's dangerous aggressiveness, Rousseau did not have to invoke More, because he could cite a whole series of bourgeois theoreticians that held the same viewpoint.[4]

These representative writers of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment were sparing in applying the attributes "good" and "bad" to human nature. Their works not only consider antithetical qualities — for instance Machiavelli's concept of "virtue" — but as modern thinkers they strive to exclude value judgments as much as possible. In contrast with the medieval view which understood man mainly in reference to a norm, and in which nature, as opposed to the unnatural, connoted the divinely ordained constitution of human being within all creation, early modern thought began to regard as human those traits which proved to be so in terms of historical, political, and psychological analysis. Human nature was no longer to be derived from bibli-

*Translated by David J. Parent.

1. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourse* (New York, 1950), p. 64.

2. Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politik* II (Leipzig, 1922) p. 546 f.

3. Cf. Machiavelli, *op. cit.* pp. 111-115 and *Geschichte von Florenzi* in *Gesammelte Schriften* Vol. IV, (Munich, 1925), p. 268.

4. Rousseau, "*Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'égalité parmi les hommes*," in *Oeuvres complete*, III (Frankfurt, 1853), p. 25.

cal exegesis, or other authorities, but rather ultimately from directly accessible situations. Knowledge of man becomes a specialized problem of natural science. To the extent that the basic natural-scientific categories contain any pervasive value judgment, it is based on the claim that for everything in nature, and thus for the body and its indwelling soul, to perish represents the greatest evil, while self-preservation and the concomitant activity is the highest good. This simple naturalism was established in the Renaissance theory of emotions, especially by Cardeno and Telesio, who drew on the doctrines of antiquity, and systematically elaborated in the philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza.[5] This concept of nature which appeared to be unprejudiced but was in reality individualistic because it asserted that self-preservation of each thing is its law and standard, corresponds to the social condition of the bourgeois individual; the interpretation of non-human nature, which lacks any intentional relation to this social origin, is eventually projected back onto man.

Yet, although philosophy and science were convinced of their own objectivity (*Wertfreiheit*), the spirit of the times formed the very layout and elaboration of their plans: not only in the sense of the unquestioned individualistic principle that regulated the relationships of owners to one another, but also by the mental and instinctive barriers caused by the combination of this principle with the fact of different classes of society. The nature of the isolated individual is itself a dubious topic for anthropology. This isolated individual is not man in general, which is its real object of study. Yet, because of the contradictions of the bourgeois order, especially the constant need for the physical and psychic repression of the masses, the analysis of this abstract subject is further obscured and constricted by subconscious considerations. With or without the authors's intention, anthropological ideas take on moral significance; confidence or disgust, indifference or sympathy contaminate the descriptions of psychic structures and the views on the nature and course of the affects and other responses. The individual, who the anthropological ideas of this epoch thematize as man in general, therefore becomes the object of philosophical investigation in an extremely distorted manner.

The explanation for this state of affairs seems obvious. The sociological attribution of thoughts and feelings to social groups and historical movements has an especially easy task in this regard. The anthropological contradiction coincides with a political one. Historians have tried to explain the contradiction between Machiavelli and More psychologically by pointing to differences in their mental attitude and ethical disposition, or politically by contrasting a divided Italy, always threatened by invasions, with England, as administratively united island, practically safe from all enemies.[6] Nonethe-

5. Cf. Dilthey, *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. II (Leipzig and Berlin, 1914) pp. 433-435); and Bernhard Groethuysen, "*Philosophische Anthropologie*," in *Handbuch der Philosophie* Part III (Munich and Berlin, 1931) p. 139f.

6. Cf. H. Oncken, Introduction to More's *Utopia*, in *Klassiker der Politik*, Vol. 1 (Berlin, 1922), p. 38f.

less, sociological analysis teaches us that in the subsequent development of anthropology the emphasis on man's aggressive "bestial" drives indicated an interest in oppression, whereas the emphasis placed on educability or even on moral indifference in the judgment of emotional drives, was an expression of emancipatory tendencies. Those philosophers of history differ not so much in anthropology as in politics. Had politics not separated them, they could have concurred on anthropology. Only the circumstance that anthropology was used to support political goals widened the gap between the two ways of thinking. The task of applying this theory to the anthropological ideas of modern history and tracing the changes, reversals, and complications of the pattern is not just a historical problem. It is of systematic and scientific interest: the instructional content of the great bourgeois anthropology will be uncovered and appropriated by psychological knowledge.

But this obvious connection with politics will not be treated in the following pages when we speak of how anthropological thoughts are permeated with value-ideas. A closer look at the optimistic and pessimistic trends, rather, reveals a trait common to the two ways of thinking as they developed in history, which drastically diverted and weakened the focus of knowledge of man so strong in Machiavelli and the Enlightenment: the condemnation of egoism, indeed of pleasure itself. Both in the cynical proclamation of the dangerous wickedness of human nature which had to be kept in check by a strong government apparatus, and in the corresponding Puritanical doctrine of the sinfulness of the individual, who had to suppress his own desires with iron discipline and in absolute subjection to the law of duty, as well as in the contrary assertion of man's originally pure and harmonious nature which is disturbed only by the restrictive and corrupt present conditions, the absolute renunciation of every egoistic urge is the self-evident basis. This appears as a contradiction to practice. The more purely bourgeois society comes to power, the more its influence overcomes restrictions, men oppose each other with increasing hostility and indifference as individuals, families, economic groups, and classes. In the context of the sharpened economic and social contradiction, the originally progressive principle of free competition takes on the character of a permanent state of war, internally and externally. All who are drawn into this world develop the egoistic, exclusionary, hostile sides of their being in order to survive in a hard reality. In the bourgeoisie's great historically effective anthropological views, however, any emotions or drives which do not contribute directly to concord, love, and sociability are despised, distorted, or denied.

When Machiavelli states in his *Discorsi* "that men act right only under compulsion, but from the moment that they have the option and liberty to commit wrong with impunity, they never fail to carry confusion and disorder everywhere,"[7] while in the introduction claiming for himself a "desire . . . to do what may prove for the common benefit of all,"[8] this shows clearly that he

7. Machiavelli, *The Prince, op. cit.*, p. 118.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

does not observe the natural instincts of most men simply in a natural-scientific light, but regards them as bad and reprehensible. As cold and unprejudiced a stand as he consciously takes toward Christianity, he is substantially here in complete agreement with Luther and Calvin. As exponents of similar historical interests, they all break with Catholic tolerance toward certain human modes of reaction that disturb the installation of the new economic order. At the outset of this form of society, as well as in its latest phases, the wretchedness of the individual is asserted. "Luther sees in all clarity," a German treatise states,[9] "that man's will is evil, and this means not that something in man is evil, but that man himself is evil right to the root, that evil is the corrupted nature itself." In contrast with Catholicism, there is here no neutral sphere of instinctual life; the essence of man as such is evil and rotten. Similarly, Calvin teaches: "Original sin is the inherited perversion and corruption of our nature in all its parts . . . Cognitive reason and the heart's will are possessed by sin. From head to foot man is immersed in this flood so that no part of his whole being remains free of sin. Everything he does must be counted as sin, as Paul says (Romans 8,7), that all desires and thoughts of the flesh are enmity to God, and hence death.[10] Rousseau's sharp opposition to this does not refer at all to the condemnation of the "bad" drives and the pleasure in prohibited instinctual goals, but to their ubiquity, their origin and possible change. Not only Rousseau and the enthusiasm for everything natural and primitive connected with his name, (and always evident in a heartfelt style regardless of content), not only harmony-philosophers such as Cumberland and Shaftesbury who, contrary to Hobbes' anthropology, teach an innate morality, but the whole tradition of thought that glorifies the natural proves to be identical with its misanthropic counterpart since it does not at all attack the legitimacy of condemning the allegedly corrupt instincts but only the views on their development and extent.

The allusion to the figure of Robespierre, the orthodox disciple of Rousseau, suffices to exemplify the moral rigorism inherent in this sentimental theory of man. His concept of virtue agreed very closely with the Puritan view; condemnation was changed into real persecution under his reign. Political and moral opposition cannot be separated in him. He speaks of the sad consequences of Epicurean thought with the same disgust as a militant theologian.[11] There are two kinds of human behavior, according to him, virtue and vice: "Depending on the direction he gives to his passions, man rises as high as heaven or he plunges into the murky abyss."[12] This separation is exclusive; on the one hand, base, reprehensible pleasure, synonymous with crass egoism — the

9. H. Lammers, *Luthers Anschauung vom Willen* (Berlin, 1935) p. 15.

10. Calvin, *Institutio Religionis Christianae,* Transl. by E.F.K. Müller into German (Neukirchen, 1928) p. 118-120; cf. also H. Engelland, *Gott und Mensch bei Calvin* (Munich, 1934) p. 49.

11. Cf. for example the speech on "The Relations between the Religious and Moral Ideas and Republican Principles," in the 18 Floréal 1794 session of the National Convention; German by W. Blochwitz in Maximilian Robespierre, *Habt ihr eine Revolution ohne Revolution gewollt?* ed. by Kurt Schnelle (Reclam: Leipzig, undated) p. 361f.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 351.

doctrines of materialism and atheism run in this direction — and on the other, love of country and self-denial. There are "two kinds of egoism: the one base and cruel, which separates man from his own kind and strives for a solitary well-being purchased with the hardships of others; and other magnanimous and beneficial, which dissolves our personal happiness into the welfare of all while linking our reputation with the fatherland's."[13] Man is comprehended in terms of the behavior which society expects of him, and this means that an instinctual disposition that contradicts the principles actually governing social reality is proclaimed as so-called virtue. Religion, metaphysics, and moral declamation fulfilled the task of measuring man by the opposite of what necessarily had to become of him in the underlying historical world with their own cooperation. Apart from the works of a few undaunted writers, the analysis of man in the bourgeois epoch was impeded and falsified by this contradiction.

The need for an idealistic morality follows from the bourgeoisie's economic situation. The increased unchaining of free competiton needed certain inhibitions — aside from a few cynical economists of last century, even according to its own advocates and defenders. Private and criminal law see to it that this play of forces maintains a balance, however unstable, and can guarantee a relatively constant functioning of society. In addition, habits and customs likewise keep competition within certain forms and restrict it. But even insofar as the liberal principle is restricted only by such juridical and traditional limits as in a part of nineteenth-century England, its rule is a special case in economic history. Before and afterwards, far-reaching state measures were needed for the social whole to be able to reproduce itself in the given form at all. Social interests that go beyond the horizon of the individual economic subject were recognized by juridical, economico-political and other state institutions, by church and private organizations and by a philosophically grounded morality. One of the causes of bourgeois morality lies in the social need to restrain the principle of competition in the epoch dominated by it. Thus, the moralistic view of man contains a rational principle, albeit in mystified, idealistic form.[14] Furthermore, the rejection of antisocial drives is understandable from the severity of social domination. It was less necessary to preach moderation in mutual competition to the poor of recent centuries. For them, morality was supposed to mean submissiveness, resignation, discipline and sacrifice for the whole, i.e., simply the repression of their material claims. Their competition with one another, on the contrary, was desired; its mitigation by the formation of economic and political associations was hampered. The expression of their material interests, which morality here sought to restrict, was not private enterprise but common action; this was fought ideologically by disparaging those interests.

Both motifs, the general social interest and the class interest, pervade the

13. *Ibid.*

14. Cf. the remarks on "Materialism and Morality," Vol. I, p. 71ff.

critique of egoism. The contradiction contained in morality, stemming from this dual root, gives the bourgeois concept of virtue, as it appears even among progressive thinkers and politicians, its vagueness and ambiguity. The condemnation of egoism, to which anthropology counterposes the thesis of a nobler human nature or its sheer stigmatization as bestiality, basically does not apply to the striving of the mighty for power, prosperity within sight of misery, and the maintenance of anachronistic and unjust forms of society. Since the bourgeoisie's victory, philosophical morality has applied ever greater mental acumen to maintain impartiality on this point. The majority of mankind should, rather, accustom itself to restraining its own demand for happiness, repressing its wish to live as well as that small minority which was quite willing to have its existence be condemned by this useful moral verdict. This importance of bourgeois morality as a means of domination became increasingly important. In today's totalitarian states, where all intellectual life is understood solely from the viewpoint of manipulating the masses, the more radical, humanist elements of morality are intentionally stripped away and the individual's purposes are declared inconsequent, vis-à-vis whatever the government designates as a common goal. In a few currents of utilitarianism, particularly in liberal national economy, self-interest is proclaimed to be the legitimate root of action, and then reconciled by farfetched constructions and obvious sophistries with the unselfish behavior required of the masses. Yet other authors, who did not advocate egoism merely within conventional bounds, purely 'theoretically" and, as it were, tongue-in-cheek,[15] but proclaimed and recommended it openly as the essence of this form of social existence, were considered suspect and hated. The critique of egoism fits better into this system of egoistic reality than its open defense, for it is based increasingly on the denial of its own nature. Public acceptance of its rule would simultaneously mean its end. However little the average member of the ruling strata can secretly understand any other but narrowly egoistic motives, he nevertheless becomes indignant when anyone publicly propagates them. The egoism that has recently been sanctified, the "sacro egoismo" of military states, is for the individual of the mass, rather, the opposite of self-interest and leads him to renounce prosperity, security and freedom. It designates the aggressive tendencies of small groups of society and has nothing to do with the happiness of most individuals. Frederick II of Prussia indignantly defended his unprejudiced, egoistic policy against Machiavelli, who had however founded it from the first; and Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*, in which under the motto "Private vices, public benefits" he discovers egoism to

15. Cf. Jeremy Bentham. His basic moral principle is so indefinite that two German philosophers have interpreted it in exactly opposite words. According to W. Wundt, in "*Uber den wahrhaften Krieg*," (Leipzig, 1914), p. 21f. there is no doubt that Bentham meant "Let each do what is useful to him." According to O. Kraus in J. Benthams *Grundsätze für ein künftiges Völkerrecht und einen dauernden Frieden*, ed. by O. Kraus, (Halle an der Saale, 1915), p. 8; on the other hand, it reads "Let each one make himself as useful as possible." The contradiction contained in this concept of egoism disappears if one refers back to the society whose classes it applies to in different ways. Depending on the individual's social situation it assumes one meaning or the other.

be the foundation of present society and propagates it, was, characteristically enough, specifically refuted by one of the most representative philosophers of the ruling bourgeoisie.[16] Mandeville himself knew exactly that the open advocacy of egoism is unwelcome to precisely those persons who embody it most strongly. Each of them "would have us believe that the pomp and luxury he is served with are as many tiresome plagues to him; and all the grandeur he appears in is an ungrateful burden, which, to his sorrow, is inseparable from the high sphere he moves in; that his noble mind, so much elevated above vulgar capacities, aims at higher ends, and cannot relish such worthless enjoyments; that the highest of his ambition is to promote the public welfare, and his greatest pleasure to see his country flourish, and everybody in it made happy."[17]

What is expressed in philosophy as the contempt for instinctual desires turns out in real life to be the practice of their repression. All instincts which did not move in predesignated channels, every unconditional desire for happiness was persecuted and repressed in favor of "moral" strivings related to the "common good" and to the extent that this common good contradicted the most immediate interests of most individuals, the transference of psychic energies into socially permitted forms lacked any rational explanation, and society needed an education dominated by religion and metaphysics in addition to physical force in order to domesticate the masses. In all of history, even in periods which proved to be relatively progressive, excessive self-denial has been demanded of the vast majority. Self-discipline and conciliatoriness, both among themselves and toward the rulers, were taught them by all means of coercion and persuasion. Individuals were restrained; after all, in official consciousness and in their own, they were moral beings. Bad desires and passions might slumber at the bottom of their soul, but only weak and depraved natures fall prey to them. Though the rulers themselves were forced to act ruthlessly in the hard struggle for existence, that was one of the bitter necessities. A real specimen of the privileged bourgeoisie is so strongly indoctrinated with the moral propaganda his class directs all at the rest of society, that his own ideology does not permit him to enjoy the exploitation and control over men and things; rather he must regard it as a duty to the whole, a social accomplishment, the fulfilment of a predesignated career, so that he professes and approves it. The Renaissance paintings in which wealthy donors with unmerciful and sly faces kneel as humble saints under the cross can be regarded as symbols of this epoch of unchained self-interest. The struggle against egoism goes further than single desires; it applies to emotional life as a whole and ultimately turns against any unrationalized, free pleasure which is sought without justification. The assertion of its harmfulness is merely incidental to the argumentations. Man as he should be, the model underlying bourgeois anthropology everywhere, has a limited relation to pleasure, because he is oriented toward "higher values." In the life of the exemplary man, there

16. Cf. Berkeley, *Alciphron*, 2nd Dialogue, #4 and 5.
17. Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees* (London, 1934), p. 121.

is little place for pleasure in its most direct form as sexual, or more extensively, material pleasure. The work done by the individual for himself and others is done for the sake of higher ideals, connected only loosely, if at all, with pleasure. Duty, honor and community determine the true man and distinguish him for the animals. In all activity that claims to have cultural value, the greatest emphasis is placed on the absence of pleasure as a motive. This does not mean that joy is rejected openly and fully. On the contrary, in the darkest work-places, in the most monotonous procedures, under the saddest conditions of existence in a life marked with deprivation, humiliation and dangers, without prospects of lasting improvement, men are, at all costs, not supposed to be depressed. The more religious consolation loses credibility, the more the cultural apparatus meant to create joy in the common man is refined and expanded. The tavern and folk-festival of the past, the sports and political mass exhibitions in the present, the fostering of a cheerful family life and the modern entertainment industries, both light and serious radio broadcasts, all are designed to evoke a satisfied mood. Nothing makes a man more suspect than when he lacks an inner harmony with life as it happens to be. The prescribed joyous temperament is, however, very different from orientation toward the pleasures of life or the joy that stems from real satisfaction. In the bourgeois type, happiness does not radiate from pleasurable moments to his whole life and color brightly even those sectors that are not as such delightful. The capacity for direct pleasure is weakened, coarsened and in many cases completely lost through the idealistic preaching of improvement and self-denial. The absence of blows of fate and conflicts of conscience, i.e. a relative freedom from external and internal pains and fears, a neutral, often very dismal state in which the soul usually oscillates between extreme activity and stolid impassivity is confused with happiness. The tabooing of "common" pleasure has succeeded so well that whoever allows himself any seems to become "base" instead of free, crude instead of grateful, stupid instead of clever. In marriage pleasure retreats before duty, but the social state to which pleasure was always ascribed as its profession has sunk so low and become so despised that it is almost on a level with crime. Pleasure has been banished from the light of cultural consciousness to the sad refuge of narrow-minded obscenity and prostitution. In the historical process in which the individual attained abstract consciousness of his own self, the abolition of slavery ended one form of class society, but not classes themselves, and so it did not only emancipate man but also enslaved him internally at the same time. In the modern age, the domination is concealed economically by the superficial independence of economic subjects, philosophically by the idealistic concept of an absolute freedom of man, while it is internalized by subduing and mortifying the claims to pleasure. This process of civilization admittedly began long before bourgeois era, in which however it first led to the formation and stabilization of representative character-types and gave social life its stamp.

II

In the quieter periods of the last centuries, to a superficial onlooker it would seem that men had adjusted to the moral ideal of love and helpfulness, or at least were beginning to draw closer to it. The antagonistic mode of production, in which the principle of coldness and enmity necessarily dominated reality because all faced one another as competitors, developed positive aspects when compared with the earlier forms of society. Every further step of realization, every expansion of competition brought improvements and provided stronger evidence that social life could be kept running on the basis of the new principle of uncontrolled economic activity. But these calmer times, which on closer inspection were really quite turbulent, were interrupted not just by wars, famines and economic crises, but also by revolutions and counter-revolutions, and all these events provide historical material for the connection between bourgeois man's morality and his mode of behavior. This relationship does not emerge as clearly in the counter-revolutions as in the revolutions. The termporarily victorious counterattacks of Catholicism in the 17th century England, the rule of the Bourbons after the fall of Napoleon, the crushing of the Communes took place so exclusively under the sign of revenge that the contradiction between bourgeois man's morality and reality, between social existence and its ideological reflection, cannnot come fully into focus. In the counter-revolutions, reactionary groups of the bourgeoisie triumphed together with the remnants of feudalism. Typical of the historical mechanisms which reproduce the bourgeois character are, rather, movements which are evaluated, at least by more progressive historians of the bourgeoisie, as positive, i.e. as coinciding with the goals of their class. The smaller revolts of this kind, which pervade the whole history of Europe, such as the civil wars in the Italian cities in the sixteenth century, the Dutch sectarian wars in the seventeenth, the Spanish uprising in the eighteenth, the student agitation and other small revolts in Germany and France during the first half of the nineteenth century demonstrate that the major revolutionary events of any country emerge from a background of incessant struggles. The miserable situation of the impoverished population was their cause, and the urban bourgeoisie played the leading role. Only a few historical actions will be pointed out here, which show especially clearly how the peculiar dispositon of socially important groups of the bourgeoisie stood in contradiction to their own morality. While in the historical everyday life of modern times, the particular kind of wickedness and cruelty at work in this epoch is often hidden from those strata that did not experience it personally, it often becomes more clearly visible during periods of loosened social order. The following pages attempt to describe the common structural features of familiar events of modern history. Although the significance of these events for the progress of mankind varied greatly — a few are completely local, a few more religious than political — still, at these exceptional moments, the social constellation becomes recognizable with its most important mediations: the idealistic hierarchy of

values, the theoretical condemnation of egoism, and the brutal and cruel streak in the bourgeois type's disposition. Both, real human existence and the contradictory moral consciousness, as well as their dynamic interaction, result from the social basis. Now the development of a few typical categories in terms of the historical material is necessary.

From the episode in which the Romans under the leadership of Cola di Rienzo made the untimely attempt to unite Italy under a democratically disguised dictatorship, until its modern realization on the same soil, the awakening and spread of bourgeois forms of life is marked with popular revolts. Despite all differences in their historical character and their function for social progress, they show common social-psychological features, which are especially important from the present perspective. Savonarola's rise and brief glory in Florence is symptomatic of a whole series of similar tendencies of the century. The struggle against the archaic state of ecclesiastical organization is taken up by clerical leaders who personify the interest of the rising individualistic society. The Reformationists, as successors to a series of militant religious figures, achieved the necessary changes in the ecclesiastical field. The English and French revolutions of the next centuries introduced the political form needed by the economy. Corresponding tendencies developed in Germany in connection with the wars of liberation and the resistance to the subsequent reaction. The typical course of these bourgeois movements is being repeated in the present; the form is now grotesquely distorted because the progressive function which those past strivings filled in regard to the possible elimination of the prevailing contradictory state of society is today no longer linked with the bourgeoisie's activity but has passed over to groups dominated by it. As the horror at the murderous practices of Chinese and Indian medicine, which were formerly productive, has been intensified by comparison with modern surgery, and the stupid superstition of the native patient who rejects modern medicine only to submit himself to a more primitive one causes all the greater a shock, the wider the gap between the two has grown and the more generally evident it has become, so the present movements — seen from the point of the interests of the whole society and not from those of the national power-groups — bear the stamp of futile and ridiculous fanaticism. And as those medical practices, looked at in isolation, have remained the same despite this change, the social movements have maintained their key features, despite the radical change of function.

Their foundation displays a typical structure. The urban bourgeoisie has its particular economic interests; it needs the abolition of all conditions and laws which restrict its industry, whether they be feudal prerogatives, excessively ponderous forms of administration or social protective measures, plus the establishment of large, centrally administered, sovereign economic territories, disciplined armies, the subordination of the whole cultural life under national authorities, the disappearance of all opposing powers, a jurisprudence oriented toward its needs, and safe and rapid transportation. The

proletarianized urban and rural masses always had farther-reaching interests. While the social inequality in those historical stages was a precondition for social progress, the miserable condition of the oppressed corresponded to the utopian wish for equality and justice. The interests of the bourgeoisie in relation to the system of ownership did not agree with those of the masses; despite the progressiveness of the system which the bourgeoisie was trying to establish, from the very start it implied a gap between the owners and the majority of society which grew increasingly wide. The spread of this system ultimately meant an improvement for mankind, but by no means for all men living at any particular time. The bourgeoisie's efforts to push through its own demands for a more rational administration against the feudal powers with the help of the desperate masses of people, while simultaneously consolidating its own rule over the masses structures the peculiar way the struggle for "the people" is carried on in these movements. They are supposed to recognize that the national movement will, in the long run, bring advantages for them too. With the disappearance of the bad administration under whose abuses they previously suffered, of course no fully carefree existence could commence, as some might have dreamed in mistaken reminiscence of the Mother Church's welfare system; rather, the new freedoms mean a stronger responsibility of each individual for himself and his family, a responsibility to which he is to be held by educational efforts. A conscience has to be indoctrinated into him. By fighting for the bourgeois freedoms, he must at the same time learn to fight against himself. The bourgeois revolution led the masses not to the lasting state of a joyful existence and universal equality which they longed for, but to the hard reality of individualistic society.

This historical situation determines the character of the bourgeois leader. While his actions conform directly to the interests of particular groups of owners, his behavior and pathos are always vibrant with the misery of the masses. Because he cannot offer them the real satisfaction of needs and must instead seek to win them over to a policy which stands in variance to their own interests, he can win his followers' allegiance only in part by rational arguments for his goals; an emotional belief in his genius, which inspires exultant enthusiasm, must be at least as strong as reason. The less the policy of the bourgeois leader coincides with the immediate interests of the masres, the more exclusively his greatness must fill the public consciousness, and the more his character must be magnified into a "personality." Formal greatness, greatness regardless of its content, is in general the fetish of the modern concept of history. The pathos of justice accompanied by ascetic severity, the demand for general happiness along with hostility to carefree pleasure, justice embracing rich and poor with the same love, vacillation between partisanship for the upper and for the lower class, rhetorical spite against the benefactors of his own policy, and real blows against the masses that are to help him to victory — all these peculiarities of the leader follow from his historical function in the bourgeois world.

Particular historical phenomena are based on his role, defined by the ten-

sion between the interests of the decisive groups and those of the masses. If the leader cannot himself directly influence the masses, he needs subordinate leaders. In the absence of a clear constellation of interests, arguments alone rarely suffice; constantly renewed emotional ties are necessary. The psychological factor in the relationship of leader and followers becomes crucial in these uprisings. The sub-leaders must in turn idolize the person of the highest leader, for the vagueness of the goals, which results from the divergent interests, extends into the leader's consciousness and limits the significance of substantial political principles to which the sub-leaders could adhere. In the course of these movements, therefore, personal friendships and rivalries play an outstanding role; important conflicts between social groups are concealed even from their own representatives behind indignation over the personal reprehensibility of competing leaders and their followers. Even the great importance placed on symbols, ceremonies, uniforms and phrases, which attain the same sanctity as flags and coats-of-arms, follows from the necessity of an irrational bond tying the masses to a policy which is not their own. The enlightenment and intellectual education of the masses, especially in times of an upward-striving bourgeoisie, are certainly part of the liberation of society from obsolete feudal forms, yet the striving to set up a stock of idols, be it in the form of "personalities," things, or concepts, corresponds to the necessity to constantly reconcile the masses with the policies of certain groups of society. The more particular interests of these groups take shape and contradict a possibly more rational form of society, the more strongly do irrationalist influences on the public consciousness emerge and the less does the effort to raise the public's theoretical level play a role. Whereas, for instance, the concept of nation could stand up to intensive scrutiny at the time of the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic wars due to the general state of interests, during the following century with the intensification of internal contradictions such a scrutiny took on a more critical function; therefore the category of "nation" has largely disappeared. Even the early bourgeois movements show a vacillating relation and often a strong antipathy toward spirit and reason; only in more recent history does this anti-humanistic and barbarianizing factor, which depresses the attained intellectual level, become clearly predominant.

The modern uprisings mentioned above clearly display the implied structural similarities, Rienzo's regime obviously asserted the bourgeois demands current at the time. His modern biographer recalls expressly that his tribunate was motivated by the ideas of the reconciliation of nations and world peace, which we associate with names like Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Lessing and Schiller.[18] Freedom, peace and justice were his slogans.[19] His appointment as Papal Rector was an act directed against the feudal regime of the Roman barons,[20] and his entire program centered on the struggle against

18. K. Burdach, *Briefwechsel des Cola di Rienzo*, Part I (Berlin, 1913-1928), p. 448.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 445.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

these "tyrants" and for the national Roman-Italian idea. "...For I will continue to act impartially as I have done all my life; I am working for the peace and prosperity of all Tuscany and Italy."[21] There is no doubt that the notary public Rienzo came to power essentially due to the support of the property-owning strata in Rome. Gregorovius describes how "citizens of the second estate including prosperous merchants zealously participated"[22] in the conspiracy he led. "The guard he organized was comprised of 390 Cavalerotti, magnificently equipped burghers on horseback, and a foot-militia of thirteen platoons of 100 men each."[23] The "class of Cavalerotti, i.e., of rich burghers of old patrician houses" represented, according to Gregorovius,[24] the bourgeois upper stratum, a "new nobility" which took up the struggle against the old nobility in Rome together with the other bourgeois groups, the craftsmen and peasants. Strict justice against disturbers of public order, the establishment of a people's army, the uniform regulation of pensions and subsidies, state control of tariffs, the protection of merchants and of all transportation, a central administration, and the like, all were objects of Rienzo's first decrees. He stated from the first that he "was willing to sacrifice his life for love of the Pope and to save the people."[25] The Roman bourgeoisie looked to the Pope as the representative of a centralist counter-authority to the arbitrary rule of the aristocrats, and after Rienzo's fall Papal power in the following centuries tried to realize those demands, though with extremely varying success. Not long after Rienzo's fall, the Emperor and the Pope in Avignon consulted on how to purge France and Italy of robbers and companies of freebooters that roamed the countryside threatening trade and traffic. The same cardinal (Albornoz), who years before had brought Cola out of exile back to Rome, was assigned to convince the feudal captains to leave Italy and to move instead against the Turks.[26]

Cola's relation to the owners is clear; he represents their interests directly. His contradictory relation to the masses becomes clear with his fall. The popular uprising to which he falls prey was certainly stirred up by hostile aristocratic families. But the objective cause was "Rienzo's oppressive taxes and unscrupulous financial measures."[27] He needed a great deal of money for the services he rendered to the Pope and the Roman burghers, and it became hard for him to get it. After his banishment, when Roman burghers invited him to return to Rome to rule there again, Rienzo asked them to supply him with financial means. "The rich merchants refused,"[28] and their "Tribune" had to obtain funds otherwise. His rule in their interest became more and

21. *Ibid.* Vol. II, Part III, p. 222. "nam sine parcialitate, dum vixero, perdurabo; pro pace et statu totius Tuscie et Italie laboro."
22. Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter,* Vol. II (Dresden, 1926) p. 312.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 319.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 411.
27. Burdach, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 161.
28. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

more clearly a general oppression. The practices on which he had to rely caused the dictatorship to be hated. Financial reasons were behind his betrayal of Monreal, whom he ordered executed, and this was generally understood. The guerrilla leader's money was needed for the upstart plebeian in order to pay his militia.[29] The Pope and the bourgeoisie benefited from it, but it was Rienzo who fell into general contempt, regarded increasingly as a tyrant. Besides the "violent financial exploitation of rich and mighty persons"[30] he had to rely on all possible methods of financing. The mandatory taxes on consumer goods which he imposed, although he had previously reduced them, the acceptance of money for the release of prisoners, and terrorist acts of various kinds forced him to take increasingly extensive security measures to protect his own life. "Death to the traitor who introduced taxation!" was the cry with which the people stormed the Capitol to murder him.[31] The necessity of pleasing the rich burghers and giving more or less ambiguous assurances of devotion and loyalty to their acknowledged patron, the Pope,[32] (then far away in Avignon) meant at the same time to subject the masses to bourgeois power, and thus his reign, despite its great and progressive ideas, acquired more and more a sinister and servile character. The ambiguous feelings of the masses for such leaders, whom they at first follow enthusiastically, reappeared consequently in subsequent history. Especially in situations in which the bourgeois goals pursued by the leaders definitely surpassed that the social forces of the moment could reach, it was easy to separate the masses from their leader, since their loyalty was more emotional than intellectual. As soon as failure became noticeable, which a dictatorial apparatus of course makes extremely difficult, it quickly dispelled the magic surrounding the victorious leader, magnified to superhuman proportions. The behavior of the masses at the fall of Rienzo, Savonarola, the de Witt brothers, Robespierre and many other idolized popular leaders is itself part of the cruelty at work in history under discussion here.

The importance of symbols is clearly evident in Rienzo's early-bourgeois revolt. The importance he set on his own clothing and pageantry is typical. "When going to the cathedral on the feast of St. Peter and St. Paul, he sat on a high battle-horse, in green and yellow velvet clothing, a shining steel scepter in his hand, with an escort of fifty speersmen; a Roman held the flag with his coat-of-arms over his head; another caried the sword of justice before him; a knight scattered gold among the people, while a solemn procession of *Cavalerotti* and Capitol officials, of commoners and nobility, preceded or followed. Trumpeteers blared from silver instruments and musicians played silver hand-drums. On the steps of St. Peter's the cardinals greeted Rome's dictator by singing the *Veni Creator Spiritus*."[33] Drawing on the first biography,

29. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
30. Burdach, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
31. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 381.
32. Cf. Burdach, *op. cit.*, p. 451.
33. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 321-353.

later descriptions report how after his campaign against the barons he returned to Rome to meet the Papal legates. He "rode with his retinue to St. Peter's, got from the sacristy the precious, pearl-embroidered dalmatic in which the German Emperors were crowned, and put it on over his armor. So, with the silver crown of a tribune on his head, scepter in hand, and, while the trumpets blasted, he entered the Papal palace like a Caesar, presenting a half frightening, half fantastic sight, before the astonished legates, and he scared them into silence with grim, curt questions."[34] The Pope wrote with indignation to the Emperor about Rienzo's pagan inclinations. "Not satisfied with the office of Rector, he insolently and unashamedly usurps various titles... In contrast with the mores of the Christian religion and in accordance to pagan customs, he has worn various crowns and diadems and undertaken to pass foolish and illegal laws in the manner of the Caesars."[35] The ceremony on August 1, 1347, in which he had himself knighted and, before many dignitaries including the papal vicar, cleansed himself of all sin in the ancient bathtub of the Emperor Constantine, certainly derive from medieval customs. Yet, on the other hand, Cola posed as a man of the people: as a democratic measure he abolished the use of the titles Don and Dominus, which he reserved for the Pope, prohibited the use of aristocratic coats-of-arms on houses, and the like.[36] The tremendous emphasis he placed on symbolism in connection with his own person can therefore not be explained solely in terms of tradition. It was based on the necessity of establishing himself the new, emotionally recognized authority. Likewise, the handing of flags to delegations is essential to this leader: "On August 2, Cola celebrated the Feast of Italian Unity or the alliance of the cities, at the Capitol. He handed the envoys large and small flags with symbols and put gold rings on their fingers to signify their marriage with Rome."[37]

The striving to reintroduce old customs and to refurbish the glory of antiquity in general is connected with this symbolism. However much this kind of leader portrays himself as revolutionary and innovator, it is not in his nature to rebel against the existing order and squeeze from the conditions whatever is historically possible for human happiness. They experience themselves as executors of a higher ancient power, and the image that inspires them bears more features of the past than of a better future. The psychic structure underlying this behavior among leaders and followers has been extensively described by Fromm.[38] "In the name of God, the past, the course of nature or duty, activity is possible [for this type of character], not for the sake of the

34. Burdach, *op. cit.* p. 449.

35. *Ibid.* Vol. II, Part IV, p. 112f.: " . . . non contentus officio Rectoris, varios titulos impudenter et temere usurpavit . . . christiane religionis mores abiciens ac priscos gentilium ritus amplectens, varias coronas laureasque suscepit ac fatuas et sine lege leges more Cesarum promulgare temptavit . . . "; Vol. I, p. 31.

36. Cf. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 332.

38. *Studien über Authorität und Familie*, Schriften des Institutes für Sozialforschung, Vol. V (Paris, 1936) p. 120ff.

unborn, the future, the still powerless, or simply happiness. The authoritarian character draws his strength for active behavior from reliance on higher powers." The masses to which those leaders turned were generally in a miserable situation, and since they were not integrated into a rational work process, they displayed an underdeveloped, both authoritarian and rebellious, psychological state[39] and had hardly a trace of independent class consciousness.[40] Despite the leader's efforts to incite the people to rebel against the prevailing conditions, he never intended to destroy the masses' disposition to mental dependancy and blind credulity in authorities. The leader's propaganda does not combine the critique of the authorities that must be toppled with any tendency for unrestricted rationality. While the old system contained the masses with the help of irrational ties, it is not immediately replaced by a society that truly represents the general interest, as bourgeois ideology nevertheless claims. The more legitimate authorities are toppled or at least attacked by the spread of freedom, the more strongly the need is felt to glorify the authority of the new rulers with reference to older powers that are untainted by the present dissatisfaction. The living "conjure up anxiously the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from their names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time honored disguise and this borrowed language."[41]

From an early age Cola was attracted to the idea of the old Romans. It is reported how, long before taking power, "a fantastic smile used to play" around his mouth "when he explained ancient statues or reliefs or read inscriptions from marble tablets scattered all around Rome."[42] Later he justified himself to the Pope by asking what harm could it do to faith, if he revived the Roman titles together with the ancient rites.[43] His choice of holidays is based on old dates and celebrations; his entire behavior is guided by the idea of restoring the Roman Empire. He speaks of "Rome's sacred soil,"[44] and seeks to place his entire program, as it were, under the aegis of his nation's glorious past. By thus surrounding himself with the aura of ancient forces, he places himself under the protection of a strong present power. "He feels that he is executer, renewer, deepener, carrier of Boniface VIII's imperial tendencies, and yet — as Clement VI writes — he wants to be just a servant and helper of the Pope and declares himself ready to abdicate immediately, if the Pope so wishes."[45] Cola always professed his loyalty to the Pope and acted in his name. Of course, he also regards himself as directly commissioned by God, as well as by these old and present forces. "He believes God has, by calling him, led the

39. On the identity of the authoritarian and rebellious character, cf. Fromm, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

40. A document on the beginnings of this social self-consciousness shortly after Cola's time is the famous speech by a worker in the Florentine uprising, reported by Machiavelli in his *History of Florence* (New York, 1901), pp. 142-144.

41. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1963), p. 15.

42. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

43. Cf. Burdach, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 454; and Vol. II, Part III, p. 164.

44. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 475 and 479.

45. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 451.

Roman people out of the darkness of tyranny, i.e., of the barons, into the light of freedom, peace and justice, and delivered Rome, the *domina gentium*, *sanctissima urbium* (mistress of the nations, most holy of cities)...from tribute, transforming it from a robbers' nest to its original nature."[46] "The people regarded him as a man chosen by God."[47] Although he and his like seek to offer the masses the spectacle of a freedom movement, at the same time they adopt the pathos of absolute obedience to higher truths and thus present the example of a submissiveness which is to be emulated by their followers' loyalty to the leaders and to the bourgeois forms of life. As much as the whole world must tremble before them in fear, they themselves display the image of fear of other yet higher supreme beings. Their role in society is repealed in their psychology: they defend the owning strata both against old, restrictive privileges which were a burden to the whole society and against the lower class's demands on the new system. Thus their drive for freedom is abstract and relative. Dependency is merely changed, not abolished. The progressive moment is more clearly evident in the works of those writers who represented the age than with the politicians. Philosophy and poetry reflect both the critique of the present and the more radical desire for a society without oppression; in contrast the ambivalent speeches of the politicians, full of slogans, reveal the brutality of the bourgeois order.

Similarly, Savonarola represented bourgeois demands which brought him into conflict with the masses in the course of the revolt he unleashed. A just administration, honest officials, political acumen, respect for privacy, the punishment of national unreliability, and especially juridical reform and in general the fulfillment of civic duties are the typical demands of the bourgeois politician. His proposal for the Florentine constitution, which he himself expressly characterized not as the result of inspiration but of his own convictions was drafted on the odel of the Venetian Republic.[49] The real enemy against which the political innovations were directed was the great noble families with their privileges, especially the Medicis, who had come into conflict with middle classes which had gained strength under their rule. In Florence, unlike Venice, no old aristocracy with a solidly established administration developed gradually to a commercial oligarchy; instead, individual houses which had risen rapidly with the expansion of commodity and currency traffic competed with others for priority. To side with the majority of the ascending burghers and craftsmen meant an anti-aristocratic struggle which bore many petit-bourgeois traits. Just as Cola 150 years earlier had ranted against the barons, Savonarola assailed the "tyrants." While his treatise on Florence's constitution and government[50] addressed mainly religious reforms, the hatred with which the feudal nobility and its system is discussed

46. *Ibid.*, p. 450.

47. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

48. Cf. J. Schnitzer, *Savonarola*, Vol. I (Munich, 1924), p. 227.

49. Cf. K. Kretschmayr, *Geschichte von Venedig*, Vol. II (Gotha, 1920) p. 130f.; also J. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 210.

50. *Trattato circa il reggimento e governo della città di Firenze.*

recalls Rienzo's drastic style in such matters and occasionally even the journalism of the French revolution.

In the course of the decisive disputes on an oligarchic or democratic form of government, Savonarola advocatd popular rule before meetings of 13,000 to 14,000 people;[51] all his life he fought for an orderly bourgeois government. Like Cola, he too was especially concerned that the poor, widows and orphans should receive assistance, but only insofar as they could not work. "Whoever lets himself be supported, although he can himself take care of his own support, is stealing bread from the poor and is obligated to give back everything he has received beyond his need. Finally the poor must prove themselves worthy of the benefits given them by honorable behavior, otherwise they are unworthy of the water they drink."[52] Savonarola spoke up against feudalism and for civil liberties. He spoke for the people. He both maintained and blurred the difference between the privileged bourgeois groups and the lower strata. He deeply hated riots. 'Savonarola pleaded for mercy not only for the small and lowly, but also for the great and prominent. Hardly had he returned from Pisa, when the first word he exclaimed to those burning for revenge against the followers of the fallen government was: *Misericordia*. And he repeatd this admonition untiringly in the following period." When the people question whether the evil-doers should not be punished, he explained: "If God wanted to deal with you according to the justice you are shouting for, not ten of you would be spared. If you ask me however, 'Good, monk, how then do you understand this peace?' I answer you, 'Give up all hatred and resentment and forget and forgive everything that happened before the most recent revolution, but from now on whoever errs against the republic shall be punished'."[53] The bourgeoisie's double front found clear expression in the constitution he inspired: "The lower classes, who did not belong to the guilds had as little share in the governmental power as the noble families.."[54] Membership in the great council was limited according to age and social position. In taxation "precisely the nobility, the large landowners not represented in the guilds were the ones who...were most heavily affected, no less however the lowest circles, since the most necessary foods such as grain, oil and wine were made considerably more expensive by such taxes."[55]

The difference in the concreteness of Savonarola's and Rienzo's proposals is due in great part to the much more developed social conditions which corresponded to the Dominican's activity. Although the Florentine burghers could be no means confront the Pope with the same self-consciousness of their model, the Venetians, nevertheless, Alexander Borgia's court so fully displayed all the traits of the contemporary ecclesiastical hierarchy opposed to bourgeois interests that Savonarola for a time could dare oppose Borgia openly

51. Cf. R. Roeder, *Savonarola* (New York, 1930) p. 131.
52. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 204f.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 213f.

and not simply behind ambivalent phrases.[56] Although he could not risk a total break with the Pope because Church sanctions would have seriously damaged the city's trade, the enmity between the degenerate higher and lower clergy and their current leader and the Florentine bourgeoisie was open and mutual.[57] Savonarola himself appealed not to the current Pope but to the genuine Papacy, the genuine Church and to Christ himself. He considered Alexander an unbeliever, indeed not even a Christian. Nonetheless, he could not forego protecting his actions by appealing to this most recognized power of the time. He always regarded himself as a representative of higher powers.

Although Savonarola seems to be more clear-headed and rational than Rienzo, he regarded himself as a prophet, or a least as a man gifted with supernatural intuition. As for a series of mystical saints and founders "the mystical love of God was for the *Frate* too the lofty school of the apostolate and of the ardent love for the Church, the mystical bride of the Savior, which animated him with holy candor to reprimand with relentless severity the undutiful pastors who had surrendered their flock to the rending wolves. The mystic Savonarola was the father of the prophet Savonarola."[58] The description, in his work on the triumph of the cross, of the triumphal carriage pulled by the apostles and preachers, on which Christ with his crown of thorns and stigmata is enthroned, the Holy Scriptures in his right hand and martyr-instruments in his left, chalice, host and other cult-objects at his feet —this enthusiastically composed picture[59] recalls Cola's fantastic dreams and allegories. In the case against him, Savonarola was accused of having spoken of his journey to Paradise for his own magnification, and no doubt he had fostered belief in the magic power of his person. Shortly before his fall he had, "before an innumerable crowd of people evoked the Redeemer present in the host which he held in his hands to send down fire from heaven and wipe him from the face of the earth if he did not walk in full truth. Never had he left any doubt that God would, if necessary, prove the rightness of his prophetic mission, even by supernatural means." He threatened his opponent: "You have not yet forced me to perform a miracle; but if I am compelled to, then God will open his hand if his honor demands it, although you have already seen so many miracles that you need no further miracle."[60] But whether he accepted the trial by fire, whose failure marked the beginning of his end, more at the urging of his followers than out of conviction is uncertain. The magnifications of his person by his closest followers and by his own speeches was an indispensable means for his influence on the masses. This magnification of the person of the monk as popular tribune has been noted

56. Machiavelli's admiration for Cesare Borgia, who in some regards himself bears the traits of a dictator of the bourgeois epoch, referred mainly to his national political goals and not, for instance, to the state of the hierarchy.

57. Cf. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 324ff.

58. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 630.

59. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 465.

60. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 506f.

repeatedly in history as a principal instrument of his policy. "I find that when Savonarola is spoken of," writes H. Grimm,[61] "his fall is depicted excessively as the result of efforts of his enemies and of papal anger. The most compelling cause for his fall was the decline of his personal power. The people grew tired. He had to stir up their spirits more and more strongly. He succeeded for a time in reviving their slumbering enthusiasm. But while from the outside it seemed to grow, it was really consuming its last energies." Of course, if the petit-bourgeois groups that stood behind Savonarola had had the capacity to set up their own power permanently, then the disproportion between his real qualities and the image of the superman his followers developed would not have led to his downfall. The endowment of the leader with magic qualities was a condition for his influence on the masses. His fall resulted from the differences between the ruling groups themselves.

In Savonarola an essential aspect of bourgeois revolts become evident. The needs of the mobilized masses are utilized as a motor for the dynamics of the revolutionary process, but the condition toward which the movement tends in terms of the historically attainable balance, i.e., the consolidation of the bourgeois order, can satisfy them only to a very limited degree. Therefore it is important that during the movement the unleashed forces be redirected inwardly and spiritualized. The process of "internalization," which began as early as the Middle Ages, has one of its roots here. Thode interpreted the work of the great founders of orders at the beginning of the thirteenth century in this manner. "No power, however great," he writes[62] in the introduction to his book on St. Francis, "can't silence the just demands of the *tiers état* which was awakening to self-consciousness, although its goals were too indefinite for the movement to have become unified, independent and self-regulating. Then, called forth by the eternal laws of logical historical development, Francis of Assisi, in his genial capacity to make and carry out intuitive decisions, found the conciliatory words! He led the impetuous progressive stream into a delimited riverbed and so acquired the merit of having preserved it from an untimely division; he gathered its forces and directed it toward a unified goal. The goal is man's internalization..." Thode sees Christian doctrine as the "beneficially restrictive riverbed," and he regards the new art as the first product of this process of sublimation. With the development of the contradiction between burghers and masses in the centuries after St. Francis this internalization of social interests changes from an expression of the immaturity of the "*tiers état*" compared with the powers that ruled the world into a practice of this class itself toward the people it dominates. The historical movements we are speaking of here thus increasingly show the translation of individuals' demands on society into moral and religious demands on the dissatisfied individuals themselves. The bourgeois leader tries to idealize and spiritualize the brutal wishes for a better life, the abolition of differences of

61. H. Grimm, *Leben Michelangelos*, Vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1922) p. 188f.

62. H. Thode, *Franz von Assisi und die Anfänge der Kunst der Renaissance in Italien* (Berlin, 1926) p. xxiv.

wealth and the introduction of real community — ideas are represented in those centuries by religious populists and theological Utopians. Not so much revolt as spiritual renewal, not so much the struggle against the wealth of the privileged as against universal wickedness, not so much external as internal satisfaction are preached to the masses in the course of the revolutionary process. The German reformer hated rioting even when it was directed against the Pope, the devil in human form. As Savonarola had called the people's revolt against the Medici "pharisaic justice,...that stems from vengefulness"[63] and wished the people would look at their own sins, Luther said of the peasants "that they wanted to punish the authorities for their sins; as if they themselves were completely pure and innocent. Therefore God had to show them the beam in their own eye so that they might forget the splinter in another's."[64] "...the common man's temper must be calmed and he must be told to refrain from inordinate desires and words that lead to revolt, and to undertake nothing without command of the authorities or action of the governmental power....But if you say: 'What should we then do if the authorities want to do nothing? Should we then endure longer and strengthen their malice?' The answer: 'No, you should do none of this: you should do three things. First: recognize your sins, for which God's strict justice has plagued you with such an eschatological authority. Second: humbly pray against the Papal authority. Thirdly: let your mouth be one mouth with the spirit of Christ, of whom St. Paul said: Our Lord will slay him with the mouth of his spirit."[65]

The extremely progressive character of this transformation process is not at issue here. The disciplining of all strata of the population, which followed from the need to incorporate the masses into the bourgeois mode of production, affected the development of the economic form; not just the astonishing development of technology, the simplification of the work-process, in short the increase of human power over nature, but also the human preconditions for a higher form of society are unthinkable without the process of spiritualization and internalization. This cultural process, as well as other aspects of the ideological process that dominate spiritual life in so-called normal times, is merely brought out with particular clarity in the activity of the leaders promoting morality and religiosity. Savonarola's Florence is permeated with a wave of religious and moral enthusiasm, similar to the way cities and countries were gripped by Protestantism. While in the later uprisings the idealistic heroism is expressed mainly as sacrificial zeal for the nation, in the earlier ones religious excitement predominates. "A religious spirit penetrated the redeemed people, Gregorovius states in describing Rienzo's revolt, "like that of the British in Cromwell's time."[66] The hypostatization of belief in a higher freedom and justice takes place, as it is ideologically detached from turgid

63. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 204.
64. Luther, *Ausgenwählte Werke*, ed. H.H. Borcherdt, (Munich, 1923) p. 165.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 7ff.
66. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

common interests of the masses during these centuries. Only in later phases of the bourgeois age is this idealistic alienation abolished as the belief in the conscious solidarity of struggling humanity is reasserted. The loud-mouthed and empty heroism that still presumes to be the heir of that formerly progressive idealism has lost all cultural importance and sinks into a vain pose, a common lie.

The leadership which channels the people to particular goals and achieves the internalization of the drives which cannot be satisfied in this period employs a specific instrument: the speech at the mass meeting. The politician in the Greek city-state was also mainly an orator and at times exercised functions very similar to those of the modern leader. But in Greek antiquity the speech is presented in the assembly of free men; the slaves comprise an element that must merely be dominated, not addressed. As much as these speeches also have enthusiastic traits, they largely lack the internalizing, spiritualizing tendency that appeals to internal conversion, which belongs to the essence of modern rhetoric. Antiquity's rationality is admittedly rigid and constrained. Its logic corresponds to a fixed, self-confident upper class; it wants to convey a particular opinion on the state of affairs, not change the listeners humanly. The change of function of rhetoric that begins with Socrates already heralds the decline of the city-state. In antiquity and to a great extent in the Middle Ages, the lower class is kept under control by physical coercion and command, by the deterrent example of terrible earthly punishments and, moreover, by the threat of hell. The popular address of modern times, which is half rational argumentation, half an irrational means of domination, belongs to the essence of bourgeois leadership, despite its long prehistory.

The sermon owes its decisive place in religious life to the aforementioned function of the word in the new society. As early as the heresy movements of the twelfth century in Cologne and Southern France, the sermon is addressed to the entire people but is promoted mainly by the property-owning classes. Contrary to some interpretations which see these early preachers as stemming mainly from the lowest social strata, it turns out "that nobles, rich burghers, priests and monks have often joined the ranks of the wandering heretical preachers and that at least to their contemporaries precisely this active participation of clergymen, of prominent and wealthy persons in the heretical movement was noteworthy."[67] Even in the oldest Franciscan association of preachers "as far as we know, the very same strata of society are represented, who were everywhere the bearers of the religious poverty-movement: rich burghers, noblemen, and clergymen."[68] The urban bourgeoisie, from which the new order stemmed, conditioned the development of the sermon as a result of its particular interests. In contrast with theories which are today, though only with relative accuracy, associated with the name of Max Weber, the religious spirit of the modern age, which finds its first expression in the sermonizing popular leaders, is not a primary and independent entity.

67. H. Grundmann, *Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter* (Berlin, 1935) p. 35f; cf. also p. 37.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 164f.

Humanism and the Reformation are connected with the rise of the bourgeois class, "which with its new views of nature and religion also creates new forms of social life and of ecclesiastical cult."[69] This is clearly expressed in the relation of the mendicant preaching orders to the cities: "The two go...hand in hand: The cities became the home of the preaching monks, and the popular religion of the latter becomes the religion of the cities. Each part gives, and each receives."[70] The monks themselves, however, come mostly from the higher social strata, which were beginning to run into conflict with the hierarchy. The religious ideas living in the sermon were as such nothing new. A primary role in the origin of the bourgeois world cannot be ascribed to them; their momentous development through and with the sermon can be understood only in connection with the economically conditioned rise of the bourgeoisie.[71] The internalization of needs and drives of the masses forms an important mediation in this dialectical process. At the beginning of the 13th century, the Catholic Church itself could not close itself off from the demands of the age; in the Fourth Lateran Council it expressly recognized the necessity of developing the sermon.

Savonarola was a precursor of the Reformers. The church became the forum for the mass meetings, which Cola held at the Capitol. His magnificant eloquence cannot be praised enough by his contemporaries. "Often he had to leave the chancery before time, because the people had broken out in tears

69. Thode, *op. cit.*, p. xix.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

71. Since the turn of the century, the reformation has been increasingly used as a background for idealist confessions; Dilthey still presented a national and a sociological vision. He attacks Ritschl for not recogizing that the "new religious valuation" which he himself described "sprang from the progress of German society . . . Germanic activity, intensified by the state of society as a will to do something, to create realities, to deal adequately with the things of this world, makes itself felt in this whole period and in Luther" W. Dilthey, "Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1914), p. 216. Troeltsch, as usual vacillates. The theologian defends himself against the suspicion of a materialistic conception of the Reformation by stressing that "Luther's religious idea really has a high personal originality; it emanates purely from the inner movement of religious thinking itself. It did not originate as a reflex to social or even economic transformation, but has its essential independent cause in the initiative of the religious thought from which the social, economic and political consequences themselves first come . . . At most indirectly, certain influences of those elements are recognizable . . . Precisely for that reason, the Reformation's world of ideas cannot be linked with any particular social class. If nonetheless one is inclined to accord it a bourgeois character, and in a certain sense rightly so, if it is contrasted with the seigneural early-medieval Church and against the democratically-proletarianly infected sects, then that is due only to that indirect connection. But this in turn is based on the psychologically easily understandable fact that absolutely all individualization of spiritual life that seizes broad masses is connected with urbanization," etc. E. Troeltsch, "Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. I, (Tübingen, 1923), p. 432f. As if an "at most indirect" connection were not also a connection! Others spoke more clearly. With a loyalty of conviction, which can dissuade one from objective arguments, H. Delbrück, for example, announces that "economic factors cannot be accorded a place among the causes of the Reformation." See his *Weltgeschichte*, Part II, (Berlin, 1931), p. 253. The confusion seems to stem from the need to set oneself off from a falsely understood historical materialism, such as Kautsky, for example, held. But precisely this world-view materialism, because of its undialectical conception of the relation between historical facts and general principles shows a relation with the metaphysical prejudices of those historians that is concealed by the factual contradiction of principles but by no means abolished.

and loud sobbing and were pleading with God for mercy in deepest contrition; often the scribes, overcome by emotion could no longer follow his words".[72] According to the Dominican's instructions, a supernatural fire should burn in the preacher. He must be ready to suffer a martyr's death himself. "If despite the preaching everything remains the same, and vices grow as luxuriantly as weeds, that is an unmistakable sign that the sermon, like a painted fire, does not ignite."[73] The masses should turn inwardly, they should become more moral, more unassuming, more resigned. They should learn to fear God, and the preacher is — this is true already for Savonarola[74] — the interpreter of the divine will, God's spokesman, his servant, his prophet. The bourgeois virtues, respect for the laws, peaceableness, love of work, obedience to the authorities, willingness to sacrifice for the nation and the like, are drummed into the people together with fear of God. The language of the sermon is democratic, it is addressed to all, but part of its message is that individuals and whole groups in principle remain outside as the wicked and the obdurate. The appeal to the masses to deny themselves the adequate satisfaction of their drives and turn them inward is accompanied, as a sort of consolation, with the oft repeated conviction that those who cannot achieve renunciation and exertion are damned and will not escape their terrible penalty. As cruelly and sternly as the clergyman or worldly leader may treat his followers, his brutality does not harm but rather heightens his reputation, since the crowd at least can pretend that they, unlike strangers and enemies, are loved by him. The Reformers' contempt for men is clearly evident in the attitude toward the followers. A sub-leader of Calvin's, Chauvet, shouts at the end of a sermon: "May the plague, war and famine come over you."[75] Another addresses his listeners as devils.[76] Luther himself spoke the proverb: "Secretly burghers and peasants, man and woman, child and servant, princes, officials, and vassals, all are the devil's."[77] This contempt for the masses, which is peculiar to many bourgeois leaders, does not in the least decrease their popularity as long as there are others on the outside who are radically lost. "As friendly, however, and sweet as this preaching is for Christians, who are his disciples, so annoying and intolerable it is for the Jews and their great saints."[78] There must be such a thing as Jews, Turks, and Papists, who stand outside the community.

While in more peaceful times, the school and other educational institutions, together with mass meetings, transmit the internalization effectively and constantly to the successive generations, in revolutionary periods the mass meeting takes on exclusive significance. It is the characteristic form of the guidance of dangerous social strata and is permeated with irrational

72. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 685.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 682.
74. *Ibid.*
75. F.W. Kampschulte, *Johann Calvin*, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1899) p. 33f.
76. *Ibid.*
77. F.v. Bezold, *Geschichte der deutschen Reformation* (Berlin, 1800) p. 570.
78. *Luthers Werke*, ed. by Buchwald et. al. Vol. II (Berlin, 1905) p. 282.

elements. In these situations it is crucial to treat the soul of the people mechanically, as is shown by the value set on external format, the songs before and after the speech, the speaker's solemn appearance. The speech itself is not geared essentially to the rational forces of consciousness, but uses them only to evoke certain reactions. Where, on the contrary, the real interests of the masses determine a leader, the opposite relation emerges. The speaker's goal then is for the masses to grasp the situation with their own consciousness; the action then follows from this as a rational consequence. What matters is that knowledge is achieved; for no other interests enter in except those of the audience, and the leader's personality can recede, since it is not itself supposed to act as a directly influencing factor. And like the leader, the mass too changes its character. The mass meeting is suitable for the purpose of exerting irrational influence; small groups of individuals with common interests are appropriate for discussions of theory, the analysis of a given historical situation, and the resulting considerations on the policy that should be followed. Movements striving to transcend the bourgeois order can therefore not use the mass meeting with the same exclusiveness and the same success. In historical dynamics, masses are not simply identical with one another, even if they should in part consist of the same individuals. How much the mass meeting in the bourgeois revolts must be understood as a psycho-physical influence, as a treatment or cure, can be seen even from its frequency and compulsory character. Attendence at them is considered a duty, men are commanded to go, indeed, sometimes they are detained there by force. This coercion is reflected clearly in the church regulations passed in the decades after the Reformation. The Saxon General Articles of 1557 state: "Thus, those who skip the sermon on holidays and Sunday morning and afternoon (but especially in the villages) and do not first excuse themselves to the pastors and judges of that place because of necessary business they must perform, shall be punished with a considerable fine, or if they have no fortune, with the pillory at the Church or other prison."[79] When under Calvin the Geneva suburb Gervais once did not seem entirely reliable they went so far as "to station a bailiff and two officers as guards during religious service, so that no member of the congregation could leave the church before the appointed time."[80] — Where knowledge is the real concern, assemblies display a completely different structure. Discussions and intellectual progress characterize their course, the analysis of the situation and of practical solutions remains in continuous connection with the developing conscious interests of the participants. No matter how the content of the speeches at the mass meetings may change, it only fulfills a mechanical function by suggesting a certain behavior. The religious and mass speakers of the bourgeoisie choose their words not so much for their appropriateness to the object as for effect. No development takes place during

79. *Die evangelische Kirchenordnung des 16. Jahrhunderts*, ed. by A.L. Richter, Vol. II, (Leipzig, 1871) p. 181; cf. also the Land regulation of the dukedom of Prussia of 1525, *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 34, the Esslingen Church regulation of 1534, Vol. I, p. 247, and many other regulations.

80. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*

the speech itself; usually no rational interaction between speaker and participant occurs that goes beyond the purely instinctual. Subsequent discussions have the same character: they lack the dialectical element. Mass movements play a role in non-bourgeois movements. Despite the undeveloped, chaotic nature of their movements, the leaders of the Roman slave uprisings and of rebellious peasants at the beginning of the modern age called their people together, consulted with them and aroused them up in tumultuous assemblies. The modern proletarian leaders prepared not only the individual demonstrations in small groups, but they also presented their views and proclaimed slogans before the masses. But though such gatherings may somewhat resemble the traits just described, just as on the other hand the bourgeois mass meetings especially in times of intensified struggle between the *tiers état* and the feudal powers at times showed revolutionary features, still the irrational, solemn, and authoritarian remains predominantly a feature of the bourgeois leader's speech.

Despite the differences between the social positions of Luther and Calvin corresponding to the circumstances in Germany and Geneva, and despite the difference in their temperaments due to their different origins and educational backgrounds, their function as mass leaders of the bourgeois age points to astonishing similarities in their behavior and character. In the first decades of the sixteenth century "the favored groups of social development" are "the bourgeois patriciate and the territorial princes, the aristocratic strata, the new particular authorities of city and country; the oppressed include the vassals, the masses, the urban proletariat, the peasants, and the small rural nobility, which is connected with the peasants' fate and displays democratic tendencies in its views and its position relative to the newly developed high nobility of the princes."[81] In Germany the property-owning bourgeois circles who were the bearers of development at that time, were completely dependent on the territorial princes in their entire policy. That Luther subjected himself completely to these princes follows from the nature of his whole life's work. He himself, "with whatever right he called himself a peasant's son, is a child of urban, mining origin and urban, mendicant-monkish education...he certainly did call farming a divine profession and the only livelihood that comes straight from heaven: 'the dear patriarchs also had it.' But he nonetheless wrote the terrible writings against the peasants, and he disapproved of the nobility's revolt. Certainly, he never hid his antipathy toward the immoral sides of patrician commercial activities, and to a certain extent he supported the canonical prohibition of usury; but that did not prevent him from understanding and approving the quest for capital as trading capital; although he was adamant against the idea of purely personal credit. And certainly he called the princes murderous rascals and God's torturers; but based on his entire situation, he had to end up "assigning a higher place to all authorities than they ever had had in the Christian world."[82]

81. Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, Vol. V, Part 2 (Berlin, 1922) p. 372.

Originally, the popular leaders make little distinction between the goals of the general public and those of prosperous groups. Only in the course of the movement do the lower classes discover the darker side, and the tension between them and the leader begins. This is true of Calvin in his second reign in Geneva and of the great politicians of the French Revolution. Engels underscored this circumstance in his treatise on the German Peasants' War: "Between 1517 and 1525, Luther had gone through the same transformation as the German constitutionalists between 1846 and 1849. This has been the case with every middle-class party which having marched for a while at the head of the movement, has been overwhelmed by the plebeian-proletarian party pressing from the rear. When in 1517 opposition against the dogmas and the organization of the Catholic church was first raised by Luther, it still had no definite character. Not exceeding the demands of the earlier middle-class heresy, it did not exclude any trend of opinion which went further. It could not do so because the first movement of the struggle demanded that all opposing elements be united, the most aggressive revolutionary energy be utilized, and the totality of the existing heresies fighting the Catholic orthodoxy be represented. [...] This revolutionary order did not last long. [...] The parties became separate from each other, and each found a different spokeman. Luther had to choose between the two. [...] He dropped the popular elements of the movement, and joined the train of the middle-class, the nobility and the princes."[83]

There is hardly another outstanding popular leader of the bourgeoisie in whose moral and religious pathos the nuances of the various interests he represents are so sharply expressed as in Luther's magnificent language. When the Gospel and the real bourgeois interests run into conflict with one another, there can be for Luther no doubt as to what place he concedes to the Gospel on earth. In the world a strict, hard, worldly power is needed to force and compel the wicked not to take, nor rob, and to return what they borrow, although a Christian should neither demand it back nor hope to get it back; so that the world not be devastated, peace perish, and the people's commerce and community be destroyed, all of which would happen if one were to rule the world according to the Gospel and not drive and coerce the wicked with laws and power to do and suffer what is right. Therefore, one must keep the streets clean, create peace in the cities and enforce law in the country, and hack away with the sword at violators, as St. Paul teaches in Romans 13, 4....No one must think that the world can be ruled without bloodshed, the secular sword should and must be red and bloodthirsty..."[84] As much as he rages against the rebelling peasants and wishes that one "stab, strike, and strangle"[85] them, however much he castigates mercy toward them as a sin and knows only one

82. *Ibid.*, p. 373f.

83. Friedrich Engels, *The German Revolutions* (Chicago, 1967), pp. 39-40.

84. Luther, "Von Kaufhandlung und Wucher," in *Ausgewahlte Werke*, ed. by H.H. Borchert, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 123f.

85. Luther, "Wider die mörderischen und räuberischen Rotten der Bauern," *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 300.

advice: "such mouths have to be answered with the fist so that sweat runs out their nose," and calls for the executioner,[86] still he is sincerely concerned that among these peasants, who otherwise should and must be mowed down indiscriminately, "there may well be some who went along unwillingly, especially those who were once prosperous." Toward these, "fairness must...outweigh law... For the rebellion was against the rich as well as against the rulers, and in fairness it can be suspected that no rich person favored the rebellion."[87] And though Luther for the sake of the parts of the nobility that were allied with him sometimes even defended them against the complaints of merchants they robbed,[88] he spoke out unmistakably against those noblemen who for selfish motives refused to spare the wealthy who had been forced to go along with the peasants. He launches strong words against these "nobles": "...filth also comes from the nobility and it may boast that it comes out of the eagle's body, although it stinks and is useless. So these too may well be of the nobility. We Germans are Germans and remain Germans, that is, sows and unreasonable beasts."[89] Luther's relation to the parties of his time stands out clearly enough.

Although Calvin in republican Geneva reminds the King of France, the protector of the hated Catholic Church, of the avengers "appointed by God's rightful calling to do great deeds and raise the weapons against kings,"[90] we should not believe that this vengeance is assigned to us as private persons; "Nothing was commanded to us, but to obey and suffer."[91] Popular assemblies, however, that is, the representatives of the upper and prosperous strata, are under certain circumstances thoroughly justified to "restrict the arbitrariness of kings, like the people's tribunes among the Romans, or the estates in our monarchies."[92] He considered an aristocratic and oligarchic form of government to be the best one; like Luther he never tires of repeating that "the civil authority exercises not only its rightful, but exceedingly holy calling, which deserves the highest honor in the whole life of mortals."[93] His love for prominent and wealthy families is well-known. "He therefore had to endure hostility and sharp criticism from his enemies for this; he was accused of flattering the rich, and much worse. But such attacks made little impression on him and were the least suited to unnerve him in his principles. And his friends, disciples and helpers walked in their master's footsteps."[94] He approved the oligarchic constitution of Bern, which moreover varied greatly from Geneva's, as Savonarola had approved Venice's, trying, like his medieval predecessor, to make his and his friends' influence dominant while preserv-

86. Luther, "Ein Sendbrief von dem harten Büchlein wider die Bauern," *op. cit.*, p. 310.
87. Luther, "Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande Sein können." *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 157f.
88. Cf. Luther, "Von Kaufhandlung und Wucher," *op. cit.*, p. 134.
89. Luther, "Ob Kriegsleute auch im seligen Stande sein können, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
90. Calvin, *Institutio religionis christianae*, trans by E.F.K. Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 596.
91. *Ibid.*.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid*, p. 587.
94. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 421f.

ing the aristocratic forms. All these leaders seek to anchor their clique in state and social life, if possible for all eternity.

The Reformers' great spiritual achievement consists in the articulation of the idea that the salvation of men does not depend on the sacramental performances of a priestly caste, but on the attitude of the individual's soul; in Calvin, this idea is further strengthened by the doctrine of free selection by grace, i.e., that each person's eternal destiny is completely separate from the Church's practices. The Reformers thus gave the individual in ideology the independence to which he was called by the transformation of reality; it was however an independence that was abstract and largely imaginary, curtailed in practice by the economy which men operate but have not mastered, and in theory by the acts of grace of an inscrutable God who is designed by men but regarded as autonomous. The cultural progress of the masses initiated by the Reformers was directly connected with a much more active processing of individuals than was usual with the old clergy. The bourgeoisie had to train its members for the new economic tasks, to a completely different degree of self-discipline, responsibility, and zeal for work than in the old times of a relatively undynamic economy operating according to fixed rules. Of course, its outstanding representatives such as the old Jacob Fugger embodied the modern attitude toward life even without the Reformation. "It is a very different matter," he replied to his friend who advised him to retire, "he wanted to earn profit as long as he could."[95] The characterological preconditions of this mentality, which were required by the new economy, adhering to the activity and not its content, had to be transmitted universally and continuously to the successive generations of various strata of the bourgeoisie and, with corresponding nuances, also to the ruling classes. Not only individual Reformers were needed; they were just the first representatives of a new bureaucracy.

Here we come upon another common trait of these historical events. They do not, like social revolutions, directly affect the economic subculture, but tend to develop and enhance the bourgeoisie's position, which it has already conquered in the economy, by modern changes in the military, political, juridical, religious and artistic spheres. The most bitter struggles are fought to renew the body of functionaries in these realms, an old stratum of bureaucrats and intellectuals, a former elite, replacing it by one more suitable for the new tasks and creating more appropriate institutions. Whereas profitable economic activity, the accumulation of wealth by the bourgeois economic subjects, is achieved before and after the uprising and merely needs liberation from the restrictive orders of the ancient regime, the cultural superstructure must be reorganized. Here new personnel are needed who are qualitatively equal to the new demands. With the consolidation of a small stratum of monopolists brought about by concentration and centralization, cultural activity is determined more and more exclusively as domination of the masses. Although the culture is addressed as much to the rulers and is held in

95. P. Joachimsen, "Das Zeitalter der Reformation," in *Propyläen-Geschichte*, Vol. V (Berlin, 1930), p. 31.

especially high esteem by them, they sometimes sense very well that this is its main function in their system; and thus — in contradiction to the great artistic and philosophical productions of his own history — deep contempt and indifference to the spirit is a trait of the ideal type of the modern bourgeois, but this shows more in his behavior than in his views and more in his instincts than in his consciousness, where the opposite scale of values generally prevails. It makes religion, the ideal values, sacrifice for the nation the highest goods of mankind, worships success in the great personalities of art and science without relation to their deeds, and remains essentially atheistic from intellectual shallowness, vulgarly materialistic and incapable of real pleasure. — Pareto blurs the distinction between the decisive economic groups and their cultural functionaries and replaces it with secondary distinctions such as between political and non-political functionaries,[96] and he thus ruined his concept of elite and elite-struggles as an instrument for understanding the whole age, an unhistorically conceived concept anyway, though it otherwise would have quite usefully characterized those cultural agents of the bourgeoisie and its doings.

While the bourgeoisie itself grows increasingly insensitive toward spiritual existence, its social situation constantly needs cultural activity, both in view of the clerical and feudal reaction and because of the need to incorporate the whole people into its system. The mighty call for inner renewal, into which at certain times the material demands of the masses are transformed, can therefore regularly be translated into the reality of the struggle between the old bureaucracy and intellectual group and one or several competing elites attempting to supplant it. A contributing factor for the promotion of the Reformation by princes and bourgeoisie, along with the contemporary concern for cultural matters, was the recognition that the Protestant church organization would not only stop the flow of money to Rome, but also run the business more economically. The Catholic clergy had in fact recognized the danger of the pro-poverty propaganda of heretical preachers at an early date, and its first great advocate, Arnold of Brescia, predecessor of Cola and the Reformers, had fallen victim to an understanding between Pope and Emperor at the end of the 12th century. Since the operation of the new, reliable and thrifty bureaucracies depends on "personalities," to an incomparably higher degree than in the feudal system, in times of transition we see leaders and leader-cliques who want to rule fighting bitterly not only against the old powers but also with one another. Under the increasing expansion of the achievement principle, which applies even to the highest officials and functionaries, they strive with all means to preserve themselves and their principles.

Outsiders must be repelled by the quarrels, personal enmities, and unchained passions of domination and revenge, which characterize the lead-

96. Vilfredo Pareto, *Traité de sociologie générale*, French ed. by P. Bovet, Vol. II (Lausanne-Paris, 1919) #2034, p. 1298; cf. also Herbert Marcuse, "Ideengeschichtlicher Teil," in *Studien über Authorität und Familie, ibid.*, p. 223ff.

ing strata of the bourgeoisie in the Renaissance and the Reformation, the French Revolution and the later bourgeois uprisings. Giordano Bruno formulated well the feeling of a great part of the educated men of the 16th century toward the Reformation. One should just see, he writes:[97] "what a miserable kind of peace and harmony it is that these Reformers preach to the poor people, apparently seeking zealously for nothing more than to have the whole world agree with their sanctimonious and conceited stupidity and concur in their evil, degenerate conscience, while they themselves do not agree on any law, any point of justice, on any doctrine, and everywhere in the rest of the world and in all earlier centuries there never has been such disunity and strife as among them; for among a thousand such pedants hardly one is found who would not have invented his own catechism and, if he has not yet published it, would desire to do so, not one who could bring himself to approve any arrangement other than his own, none who finds anything else in others than what he believes he may condemn, reject and doubt. Indeed, a great part of them is at odds with themselves, since today they cross out and recant what they wrote and stated yesterday. Let him see what kind of consequences their teachings have, what kind of practical conduct they produce as regards the works of justice and pity, the preservation and increase of the common good, whether among their people and leadership, universities, temples, hospitals, schools, and academies of art are founded, or whether they even preserve these, wherever they have installed themselves, in the same condition as they found them, and they did not rather fall to ruin or disrepair through their neglect."

The Italian philosopher's repugnance for the Reformation's rule is understandable especially due to the streak of anti-intellectualism which it has in common with many bourgeois uprisings. In the teaching of the greatest philosophers reason is man's proudest ability even though Catholicism always made a distinction between reason before and after the fall into original sin, and in nominalism, which in any case displays bourgeois traits, its reputation declined even further. Calvin, however, stresses that "all our effort, our insight and our understanding is so wrong that in God's sight we can think and plan nothing rightly." The Holy Ghost knows "that all thoughts of the wise are vain, and proclaims clearly that the human heart's every thought and desire is completely evil."[98] In contrast to St. Thomas and his successors, Calvin holds it to be "an indubitable truth which can be shaken by no arts: man's reason is so completely alienated from God's justice that everything he desires and thinks is impious, wrong, ugly, impure, and sinful; the heart is so deeply immersed in the poison of sin that only a rotten stench can come from it."[99] Luther knows no limits to his obscene denunciations of reason. The doctrine he has received through divine grace, he says, must be

97. Giordano Bruno, "Die Vertreibung der triumphierenden Bestie," German translation by L. Kuhlenbeck, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1904) p. 123f.

98. Calvin, *Institutio*, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

99. *Ibid.*, p. 161f.

preserved in a determined struggle against "the devil's bride, reason, the beautiful whore"; for "it is the highest whore the devil has." Luther senses the deep connection between pleasure and intellect and he persecutes both with the same hatred: "What I say of lust, which is a crude sin, must also be understood of reason, for it dishonors and offends God in spiritual gifts and has far worse whorish ailments than a whore."[100] Though the Reformers personally, within certain limits, esteemed art and science, these were greatly restricted due to the oppostion to graven images and the doctrine of good works in the Protestant areas. The hatred was directed primarily against aspects of art that run counter to the morality concept of internalization, in particular against every trace of the erotic and luxury in general.

Whoever reads the descriptions of those tumultuous periods of religious and national enthusiasm repeatedly finds references to a wave of bourgeois virtue and morality which, encouraged by the authorities, gripped the people. "A strict police punished adulterers and gamblers," Gregorovius writes about the Rome of the popular tribunes. Under Savonarola a whole system of informants was organized in order to make all kinds of immoralities impossible. The burning of "frivolities" is known. Under his influence and that of his followers, powder boxes, make-up and other cosmetics, also chess and other games, harps, etc., were burned as incompatible with the conversion of the masses. On a great bonfire before the Signorie, undesirable books also found a place: "The works of Boccaccio and Petrarch, Morgante and other battle-descriptions, as well as magic and other superstitious writings; finally immodest statues and paintings, the pictures of beautiful Florentine ladies from the hand of excellent painters and sculptors and precious foreign fabrics with unchaste depictions."[101] An anti-intellectual tendency asserts itself in all these popular uprisings. It is closely connected with the fact that the masses are not yet capable of an independent policy to satisfy their own interests and must internalize their wishes by the roundabout way of fetishized persons and ideas. Max Weber stressed the rationalistic trait of the bourgeois mind, but irrationalism is from the start no less associated with its history.

A further phenomenon connected with this irrationalism can be mentioned just briefly. Youth, even children, play a peculiar role in these movements. In times of a stale hindering progress, individual young people side with the oppressed and risk their lives in the struggle against the ruling powers; in those bourgeois uprisings swarms of boys and girls can easily be used to commit acts of violence and denunciations. The so-called purity and idealism of youth, a further magic element, then promotes the leader's goals and the power of his personality. Farel, Calvin's predecessor and friend, had been corrected mildly by the the city council on the occasion of a church invasion. "But God," said the Protestant reporter, "despised the advice of the wise and aroused adolescent youths against the wisdom of great men. On the after-

100. *Luthers Werke*, ed. by Buchwald et al. Vol. I, (Leipzig, 1924) p. 96f.
101. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 392.

noon of the very same day 'little children' unexpectedly stormed into the cathedral . . . filling the church with wild shouting. The 'awakening of the children' was the signal for the adults . . . There followed scenes of the crudest vandalism, incidents such as did not often occur even during the Reformation."[102] Savonarola had a regular "juvenile police." It helped him exercise moral discipline and carried the conflicts right into individual families.[103] The proletarian children, however, stayed away from these moral functions. "The children of the lowest classes of people not only did not belong to Savonarola's groups but on the contrary they showed open hostility toward them and missed no opportunity to play malicious tricks on them. They also vent their spleen on the *Frate* whenever they could."[104] The sentimental glorification of the child as a symbol of purity is one of those expressions of the bourgeois spirit which are both a means and expression of the compulsory internalization of instinctual desires. Freedom from the lusts, which can only be overcome by the most difficult self-denial, is attributed to the child.[105] Not as the bearer of theoretical and practical strength, as a guarantee of man's infinite possibilities, but as a symbol of "purity," "innocence," "childlikeness," does youth constitute an ideal in the bourgeois age. The ideological relation which this society has acquired to nature in general, not just to the child, the idealizing of primitiveness, of "unspoiled" nature, of the plot of land and the peasant are closely connected with these mechanisms.

The French Revolution seems, at first sight, to deviate from the structural similarity of bourgeois uprisings sketched here. The bourgeoisie and the propertyless masses had a common interest in removing the *ancien regime.* Repeated mass uprisings preceded it and the conditions brought about by the revolution, despite all setbacks, actually led to an improvement in the general situation in city and country in the first half of the nineteenth century. Especially the "democratization of the land" by the sale of nationalized properties was achieved to a certain extent.[106] Despite the relative community of interest of the wealthy bourgeoisie and the masses, however, contradictions in the overall course of the Revolution made themselves felt. The character and mode of behavior of the great leaders, from the very first, did not correspond to homogeneous interests of the general public, which were not at all realizable at that time, but to the admittedly progressive interest of the bourgeoisie, which however led to the exploitation and oppression of large parts of the population. Mathiez, who in his excellent works on the French Revolution explains and defends Robespierre's policy in detail, brings out this contradiction clearly enough. He traces the economic difficulties at the time of the Revolution essentially to the *assignat*-economy. All social strata that could not

102. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 166.

103. Cf. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 271ff.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 282.

105. The fetishization of childlikeness goes so far that the diminutive, the childlike form, becomes the characteristic poetic means of expression in bourgeois mysticism.

106. Cf. M. Kowalewsky, *Die ökonomische Entwicklung Europas*, transl. by A. Stein, Vol. VII (Berlin, 1914) p. 386.

match the declining purchasing power of the *assignats* by raising the purchase price for their own wares fell victim to inflation. They took up the struggle "against the cruelty of *'laissez faire'* and *'laissez passer'*." They opposed the right to property with the right to life. Though these urban and rural masses found no significant leaders, in the course of the Revolution they finally imposed a general controlled economic policy, especially the fixing of maximum prices for grain and other necessary consumer goods. But this regulation, which was wrung from the government only under the strongest mass pressure, also included maximum wages. When the desperate effort of bourgeois circles had failed to maintain the free market situation which was impossible for the poor under inflation, or even a partial market economy, the government fell into a new contradiction with proletarian strata, since it had to impose maximum wages along with maximum prices. Under the given structure of society and the prevailing mode of production even terror was not enough to foil all evasions of the food laws. When, for example in Paris, at the time when the Hebertists dominated the revolutionary section-committees, the maximum wages were kept in line less rigorously than the laws on food prices, this was out of the question in the cities of the North. "One would be very mistaken," writes Mathiez,[107] "to imagine that the revolutionary offices showed the same zeal everywhere in applying the maximum food prices. Even in the middle of the terror, the apparently mostly Jacobin city administrations were in the hands of the owners." But quite apart from these inequities the government had to alienate the masses by the wage policy made necessary by the overall circumstances.

Robespierre discovered too late that he could not carry on his revolutionary policy without concessions to the lower classes. "On the eve of his fall, supported by his friends St. Just and Couthon, he had convinced the welfare and social security committees in their sessions on the fourth and fifth Thermidor to finally implement the Ventôse (Feb.-March) regulations which had until then remained just on paper, through which St. Just wanted to expropriate the suspects (the internal enemies) and distribute their property among the poor *sans-culottes*. This would have created an entirely new class which owed everything to the Revolution, because it owed its property to it, and which would defend the Revolution. Robespierre had gone beyond democratic policy. He was on the road to a social revolution, and that was one of the reasons for his fall."[108] These laws, which incidentally, would not have affected the bourgeois system, were never enforced. Robespierre's uneasiness, which led him to revoke them, was, however, justified. He no longer had the workers' support against the wealthy who were annoyed by the mandatory price limits. In part, a new policy had to be introduced prohibiting them from changing place of employment, in the country people had to be commanded

107. A. Mathiez, *La vie chère et le mouvement social sous la Terreur*, (Paris, 1927) p. 586.

108. A Mathiez, *La réaction thermidorienne* (Paris 1929) p. 2. Cf. the detailed discussion of the Ventôse-decrees in G. Lefebvre, *Questions agraires au temps de la Terreur* (Strasbourg, 1932) especially p. 46ff.

to do the harvesting and laws against association were passed.[109] "On the 9th of Thermidor, the Parisian workers, dissatisfied with the new tarifs announced by the city authorities in the preceding days, remained indifferent to the political struggle going on before their eyes. Precisely on the 9th of Thermidor they demonstrated against the wage limits . . . When Robespierre and his friends were being led to execution, the workers shouted to them as they passed: 'The devil with the maximum!'"[110]

Robespierre is a bourgeois leader. Objectively his policy has a progressive content; the principle of society he represented, however, contained a contradiction to his idea of universal justice. Blindness to this contradiction stamps his character with an imprint of the fantastic, despite all passionate rationality. Even his teacher Rousseau was caught in the same illusions. In Book II of *Emile*[111] he states that the first idea one must give to a child is "less that of freedom than of ownership." The praise of ownership is repeated in many passages. "It is certain," he writes in an article on political economy,[112] "that the right of ownership is the most sacred of all a citizen's rights and in some regards more important than freedom itself." And he deludes himself with the hope that a government without ownership of the means of production could "prevent excessive inequality of wealth,"[113] ward off poverty, or at least make it bearable. Robespierre thinks in exactly the same manner. It was historically impossible for him to understand the immanent laws of the bourgeois economy which were politically anchored in the Revolution. Within the system advocated by Robespierre, no government could prevent the intensification of social conflicts against anonymous economic forces. Rousseau and Robespierre's personal world of ideas corresponded directly to the situation of the petit-bourgeoisie. They strongly resented the great fortunes. The principle of ownership showed them its dark side. For Rousseau, all mankind's unhappiness even begins with it. He nonetheless declares it sacred. "One did not need a revolution," Robespierre said in the National Assembly, when confronted with socialist tendencies,[114] "to teach everyone that excessive inequality of wealth is the source of many evils and crimes, but we are, nevertheless, convinced that equality of property is a chimera." The exclamation "*la propriete; que ce mot n'alarme personne*" stands at the beginning of the same speech. But if ownership is, for the French Revolution, a human right, still it is part of Robespierre's practice to put his own moderation and poverty in the right light. In general, he surrounded his person with the halo of poverty and virtue as diligently as Cola and Savonarola did theirs with divine grace. When he asserts that he would rather be the son of Aristides who was raised in the Prytaneum at Athen's expense than heir to Xerxes' throne,[115]

109. Cf. Mathiez, *La vie chère, op. cit.*, p. 581ff.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 605f.

111. Rousseau, *Oeuvres completes, op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 98.

112. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 183.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

114. Buchez and Roux, *Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution francaise*, Vol. XXVI (Paris, 1836) p. 130.

115. Cf. the speech just quoted.

that is not at all so irrational. But statements such as his claim that superfluity was not merely the price of crime but also its punishment and that he wanted to be poor in order not to be unhappy[116] are just part of the bourgeois leader's necessary self-glorification. Such conscious display of one's own ascetic virtues by word and way of life are one of the most important irrational means for magnifying Robespierre's person in the eyes of his followers. Most historians have portrayed his behavior as a purely psychological fact, without understanding it as one of those practices based on the social function of these politicians. "What is the secret of his power?" Michelet asks,[117] "The opinion which he was able to convince everyone of: his incorruptible honesty and his immutability With an admirable consistency, an astonishing tactics he succeeded in maintaining the reputation for immutability. In the end he maintained it just by his own statement. And his word carried such weight that in the end one denied the obvious facts in order to recognize Robespierre's statement as the highest authority, contrary to reality . . . Faith in the priest was back again, immediately after Voltaire. This priest denied nature and made a nature of his own by his word. And this one was hard compared with the other." Indeed, Robespierre's ascetic attitude does have magical character. He uses it as a higher legitimation.

He was not able to do without symbols either. They are part of his policy and his character. The cockades and flags play a great role in the revolution. When it is reported that Marat, on the eve of the uprising on August 10, 1792, rode through the streets of Paris with a laurel wreath on his head,[118] that was certainly not Robespierre's taste. He criticized all ostentatious behavior; the feasts of reason celebrated by the Hebertists, which were a sharp affront to positive religion, especially disgusted him.[119] But his role as bourgeois leader, which requires mass presentations, forced him to attend the Feast of the Supreme Being in June 1794, which he presided over and the plan of which he had designed together with the painter David, or at least approved. When he saw the people in the Tuilerie garden, he cried out enthusiastically: "The whole world is gathered here!"[120] In the course of this ceremony he set fire to the statue of Atheism, which had been erected for this purpose. In the middle of the flame the statue of Wisdom appeared. For the organizers and their audience this made the symbolic meaning clear. In truth, the bourgeoisie's struggle against atheism shows less wisdom in general than the government's wisdom. This society needs a religion as a means of domination, because the general interest does not hold it together. The road to the military cemetery where the National Convention was to listen to hymns[121] and national songs

116. A. Aulard, *La Société des Jacobins*, Receuil de Documents, Vol. V (Paris, 1895) p. 179.
117. J. Michelet, *Histoire de la Révolution francaise*, Vol. VIII (Paris, 1879) p. 268.
118. Cf. E. Hamel, *Histoire de Robespierre*, Vol. II (Paris, undated) p. 321.
119. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 160f.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
121. Among other things, Chéniers hymn "God of the people, kings, cities, lands, Luther, Calvin, and the Children of Israel" was intoned (cf. Mathiez, *Autour de Robespierre*, Paris, 1926, p. 121.)

from a mountain built for that purpose was passed in solemn procession. "The legislative assembly followed a group of old men, mothers, children and young girls. Robespierre, in his capacity as President, led the way. He wore Nanking trousers, a cornflower-blue jacket, a belt with the national colors, on his head a hat decorated with a tri-color crest, and in his hand, like all his colleagues in office, a bouquet of grain-stalks, blossoms and fruit."[122] Not the strangeness of the procession, which is often wrongly stressed by portrayals hostile to the Revolution, but the compulsion to have such impressive symbolic rallies, which even Robespierre could not exempt himself from, is typical of popular leaders. At the height of its revolutionary development of power the bourgeoisie recalls its earliest revolts. "The brotherhood festivals of the French Revolution in Paris appear truly to be an imitation of the August festival of the popular tribunes of Rome."[123] As a consequence of the very different political situation in which their class found itself, Rienzo and Robespierre are worlds apart — and yet something in their nature is identical, because the form of society within which they were working remain ultimately the same.

Even the historian's discussions connected with their names at times show a remarkable coincidence. Thus, Cola's modern biographer[124] accuses Gregorovius' depiction of "errors" and "clumsy criticism" for speaking of "morbid hypersensitivity," of the classical carnival games, of the "insane, blossom-crowned plebeian," and so on. How often similar statements on Robespierre have provoked the critique of historians. Michelet speaks of the incorruptable man's "morbid imagination"[125] and has been more gently reproved than Gregorovius, with whom he can probably be compared in power of depiction and "theatrical pose," as Burdach says of Gregorovius.[126] Michelet and Gregorovius are partly right, partly wrong: bourgeois leaders easily tend to have a trace of the fantastic, but this is based less on their psychology than on the social conditions. They are as realistic with their fantasy as is possible in this contradictory society. The Fantastic is a symptom of their profession; there is hardly one among them who has not been considered at least "eccentric" before or after fulfilling his historical mission. The qualities that make him suited for his role, the oscillation between love for the people, strictness and cruelty, the combination of a child's gentleness with the rage of a bloody avenger, the obstinacy of the freedom-fighter and submission to the will of higher powers, the intermingling of personal simplicity and bombastic concepts, magnificance and moral severity — all this can be only partly displayed consciously at the appropriate moment; this contradictory temperament must surely be inborn; i.e. his character is pre-formed for his achievement. All these contradictions are contained in the average bourgeois existence also. The cautious, especially "calculating" businessman, on a small scale a model

122. Hamel, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 382.
123. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 332.
124. Burdach, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 116f.
125. Michelet, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
126. *Ibid.*

of sense of reality, precision and thrift, tends, at least secretly, to improbable, romantic enterprises, and comes out with adventurous ideas at times. The leader is just the exponential version of this type. His characterological structure corresponds to that of his followers. Contemporary popular literature contains the same unmediated mixture of blood-craze and virtue, boastfulness and modesty worshiped in the leader. In his person, this mixture is "natural." It is told that Prince Colonna at times used to like to invite the notary Rienzo to dinner and have him give a speech. "The prominent gentlemen broke out in laughter once when he said: 'When I have become ruler or emperor, I will hang this Baron or have that one beheaded," pointing his finger at the guests. He walked around in Rome as a fool . . . No one suspected that this fool would one day have the terrible power to lop the heads of prominent Romans from their shoulders."[127]

Robespierre shares with the Reformers the hostility to erotic culture. The constant exhortations for purity of morals and the concomitant mania to discover filth everywhere cannot be detached from his politics. They see physical and moral filth everywhere. They hate idleness, men of loose morals, an attitude that favors pleasure and happiness. When the Genevan Rousseau in his letter to d'Alembert, lashes out at the theater and declares it an "amusement" and that if "amusements" are necessary they ought to be limited to a minimum — "every unnecessary amusement is an evil for a being whose life is so short and whose time so valuable"[128] — when Robespierre's example propagates this hatred of pleasure, he can appeal to illustrious Genevan predecessors. Although Calvin in contrast with a few of his more radical sub-leaders was of the opinion that "one must not deprive the people of all delights,"[129] under his rule dance, play, public and private parties were either completely forbidden or tied to conditions which amounted almost to a prohibition.[130] Even theatrical performances with "a good tendency"[131] were opposed on grounds of principle, although not on his initiative, by the congregation he headed. "As could be expected," a modern study of Robespierre says,[132] "he also used his power to enforce universal morality. Maximilien and Couthon, who often ate together at noon, represented a strong puritanical element on the committee. In October they encouraged the Commune in its striving to break the wave of immorality that had inundated Paris. They obtained an order from the committee to arrest the writer and owner of a theater where an indecent play was being performed." Certainly, Robespierre is infinitely more positive toward theory and reason than Luther and his followers, both because of the historical progress which had occurred in the interim and because of his role in the left wing of the bourgeoisie. But the rule

127. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, p. 311.
128. Rousseau, Lettre à M d'Alembert, *Oeuvres complètes, ibid.* Vol. VIII, p. 232.
129. C.A. Cornélius, *Historiche Arbeiten* (Leipzig, 1899) p. 475.
130. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*, p. 444.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 445.
132. R.S. Ward, *Maximilian Robespierre* (London, 1934) p. 229.

that bourgeois popular leaders fall short of the knowledge expressed by the writers who prepare the way for them applies to Robespierre too. He was very critical of the Enlightenment. "Virtue and talent are both necessary qualities, but virtue is the most necessary. Virtue without talent can still be useful. Talent without virtue is just a misfortune."[133] In the speech on 18th Floreal 1794, quoted above, he inveighed against the materialism of antiquity and the modern age, especially against the Epicureans and Encyclopedists. After a very idiosyncratic digression into the history of philosophy, he reproaches it for writing against despotism and accepting a pension from it for writing books against the court and dedicating them to kings. Robespierre criticizes the materialist philosophy for "making egoism into a system, and understanding human society as a war of treachery, success as the measure for right and wrong, honesty as a matter of taste and decorum, the world as the property of clever scoundrels."[134] He plays off Rousseau against Voltaire's circle, which of course very much hated the Genevan moralist. But the hard depiction of the world rejected by Robespierre corresponded more accurately to reality than did his own belief that after the bourgeois order is consolidated justice depends on the conversion to virtue; this idealism, however, is inseparable from Robespierre's historical task. Upon his fall, this view showed its deficiency compared with the spirit of materialism which he so disdained.

III

In order to illuminate the historical consequences of unrestrained egoism, which, despite the official morality of the modern age, is an essential trait of everyday life, a few non-everyday events were pointed out above. From the key points of its development, the revolutions, a light is cast over the bourgeois spirit as a whole and is useful in the analysis of the normal state. The question arises, why this historical meditation was necessary at all. The derivation of the psychic and intellectual narrowness of the predominant character seems simple enough. Bourgeois society is not based on conscious collaboration for the existence and happiness of its members. Its vital law is a different one. Each person thinks he is working for himself, and must think of his own survival. There is no plan prescribing how the general need should be satisfied. As each tries to produce such things in exchange for which he can obtain others which he needs, production is just barely organized so that society can develop in the given form. The more a better, more rational system becomes technically possible over the course of centuries, the cruder and more clumsy this "fine" instrument, the market, proves to be, mediating the reproduction of society only with the most severe losses in human life and property, and with the advancement of the capitalist economy unable to save mankind, despite its growing wealth, from a reversion to barbarity. By the very fact that during the epoch when man is emancipating himself he experiences himself, in the underlying economic sphere, as an isolated subject of interests,

133. Quoted according to Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
134. Robespierre, *Habt ihr eine Revolution ohne Revolution gewollt? op. cit.*, p. 362.

associated with others only by purchase and sale, alienness becomes an anthropological category. When the characteristic philosophy of the age understands man as a self-contained monad in transcendental loneliness, connected with other monads only by complicated mechanisms independent of his will, bourgeois man's form of existence appears in metaphysical form. Each one is the center of the world, and everyone else is "outside." All communication is an exchange, a transaction between solipsistically constructed realms. The conscious being of these men can be reduced to a small number of relations between fixed quantities. The language of logistics is its appropriate expression. Coldness and alienness are derivable, without further ado, from this basic culture of the epoch: nothing in the essence of the bourgeois individual opposes the repression and annihilation of one's fellow man. The circumstances, rather, that in this world each one becomes the other's competitor and that even with increasing social wealth there are increasingly too many people, gives the typical individual of the epoch that character of coldness and indifference which is satisfied with the most pitiful rationalizations about the most monstrous deeds as long as they correspond to his interest.

The above analyses dealt with only a few aspects of the historical realization of the bourgeois principle. They tried to shape the theory of bourgeois man, which results from purely theoretical derivation more concretely in regard to the trait of cruelty than is possible by purely logical derivation. If cruelty was not discussed at great length in connection with these uprisings, nothing is more familiar than this. The counter-revolutionary reactions were, as a rule, much more bloody, for they lacked even the rapidly disappearing hope of a drastic change, which in bourgeois revolutions works against resentment; the progressive elements are completely helpless and are the main target of terror. The mass is reduced from a particular factor which, though not awakened to complete self-consciousness, strives to drive the process forward and therefore plays a role of its own, to a mere instrument of revenge against the most advanced groups. In the bourgeois revolution the mass, though with changing strength and constantly vacillating, is determined by its more conscious wing; it is differentiated and alert. It must constantly be observed, convinced, and taken seriously. It is not a mass in the same sense as in the counter-revolution. Here the "mob" usually appears on the scene; it is usually, down to the psychic structure of its units, different from the mass in revolutions. The question whether the uprisings which have taken place in the most recent past in some European states must be classified more as one or the other kind of historical events, which at times have a similar character and are in any case ultimately all phases of a single process or a self-coherent totality, cannot be answered as easily as might seem from a liberal perspective. They are, at any rate, not absolutist or clerical reactions, but the inscenation of a bourgeois pseudo-revolution with radical populist trappings, opposed to any possible reorientation of society. These forms seem to be a bad imitation of the movements we have been discussing.

The role of the bourgeois leader as functionary of the property-owning strata, the surrounding of his person with magic qualities for the masses, his "charisma," the importance of symbols and holidays, the preponderance of speech over action, the call for inner renewal, the replacement of the old bureaucracy, the personal struggles between aspirants for elite-positions, the mostly psychically determined relation of leaders, sub-leaders and followers, the religious and national emotionalism, the anchoring of the difference between poor and rich in the eternal essence of the world — all these are statements of the same dynamics: masses, which have come into movement under the slogans of freedom and justice and with a tremendous vague or clear urge to improve their situation, for a meaningful existence, peace, and happiness, are incorporated into a new phase of class society. Certainly, this is just one side of the whole process. The other is the progress, which advances in leaps and bounds in these revolutions, of precisely this society in which the preconditions for a higher social order are developed in this way and not otherwise. But as long as the epoch lasts, that negative factor has its own anthropological consequences. Since the egoism of the masses led by the bourgeois leader must not be satisfied, since their demands are repressed as inner purificaiton, obedience, submission and self-sacrifice, since love and recognition of the individual are deflected toward the leader magnified to superhuman dimensions, to lofty symbols and great concepts, and one's own being with its own needs is annihilated — the idealistic morality tends in that direction — even the individual is experienced as a nothing and the individual as such, his pleasure and happiness, is despised and denied.

The feeling of one's own absolute nothingness that dominates the members of the mass corresponds exactly to the puritanical view "that practical success is at the same time the sign and the reward for ethical superiority....The doctrine that misery is a proof of guilt, although it casts a strange light on the life of Christian saints and sages, was always liked among the wealthy."[135] That the poor person is in reality worthless, is demonstrated to him anew everyday; actually he knows it right from the first. The prevailing ideology does generally contain the opposite thesis, yet man's deeper psychic layers are not determined by it alone, but equally by the constant experience of contradictory reality. The manifest ideology is just one factor in the origin of the characters typical in the society. The humanism that pervades the history of the new spirit shows a double face. It means directly the glorification of man as the creator of his own destiny. Man's dignity lies in his power to determine himself independently of the powers of blind nature within and outside him; it lies in his power to act. In the society in which this humanism spread, however, the power of self-determination is unevenly distributed; for the inner energies depend no less on external destiny than it does on them. The more remote the abstract concept of man, glorified by humanism, was from his real situation, the more pitiful the mass-individuals had to appear to themselves; similarly the idealistic divinization of man, proclaimed in the concepts

135. R.H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (London, undated) p. 267.

of the greatness, the genius and the grace-endowed personality of the leader constantly implied the self-abasement and the self-contempt of the concrete individual. But the latter is just a reflection of reality. If even the happiest person can, from one moment to the next, become like the most miserable and poorest person, not through the blind forces of nature, but through causes within human society without detectable guilt, and unhappiness is the only normal and certain condition, then the concrete individual does not count very much. Each hour society proves anew that only the circumstances, not persons, actually deserve respect. The Reformation, with its morally depressing anti-human pathos, its hatred for the earth-worm's vanity, its dark doctrine of predestination, is not so much the opponent of bourgeois humanism as its other, its misanthropic side. It is humanism for the masses, while humanism itself is the Reformation for the wealthy.

The necessity to move the greatest part of society by spiritual practices to a renunciation which is necessitated not by external nature but by the class organization gives the whole cultural thinking of the age an ideological character that stands in disproportion to the knowledge possible at this stage of technical development. Even with an organization in which only still unmastered external nature and not social conditions restricted human freedom, the limits set by nature would compel a part of the external wishes and needs to be internalized, and lead to the transformation of energies. Insofar as other goals, satisfactions and joys would then develop, these would completely lack the character of the higher, the more noble, the more sublime, which today invests all spiritual, all so-called cultural strivings compared with the materialistic non-internalized desires. The medicine-man solemnity that clings to the whole of life in all non-economic spheres because of the antagonistic constitution of society, disappears with the fetishes by means of which the masses are held in check and around whose grounding, cultivation and propagation this life is centered. The saving of aesthetic, literary and philosophical elements of the past epoch does not mean that the ideological context in which they stood is preserved. The affirmative character of culture, according to which the existence of an eternally better world over the real world was asserted, this false idealism vanishes completely but the materialism that is left is not the bourgeois one of indifference and competition; the preconditions of this crude atomistic materialism, which under the rule of that idealism was and is the real religion of practice, will then have passed. The words "the realm of freedom" do not mean that this activity to which culture has now developed should now spread in a "purified" condition and, as is generally said, benefit the "whole people." This undialectical view, which adopts the whole cultural concept of the bourgeoisie, its ascetic scale of priorities, and its concept of morality, but remains ignorant of its great artistic achievements, has dominated the reform strivings even of progressive nineteenth century political parties down to this day, made thinking shallow, and finally also contributed to defeat. With the increasing hopelessness of the masses' condition, the individual is finally left the choice between two modes

of behavior: the conscious struggle against the conditions of reality — in which the positive element of bourgeois morality, the demand for freedom and justice, is retained but its ideological hypostatization abolished. Or the unbroken profession of this morality and its corresponding scale of priorities — this leads to a secret contempt for one's own concrete existence and to hatred for the happiness of others, to a nihilism[136] which has expressed itself again and again in the history of the modern age as the practical destruction of everything joyful and happy, as barbarity and destruction.

In salient historical moments, this bourgeois nihilism is expressed in the specific form of terror. In previous history terror was in certain periods an instrument of the government. But various elements must be distinguished in this. Its rational goal consists in intimidating the opponent. The gruesome acts against the enemy are protective measures of domestic and foreign policy. But terror also pursues another intention, which does not always come to the awareness of its originators, and is more rarely admitted by them: the satisfaction of their own followers. Insofar as even in such progressive movements as the French Revolution this second element plays a role, it corresponds to that deep contempt, that hatred of happiness itself, which is connected with the morally mediated compulsion to asceticism. The preaching of honorable poverty which accompanies the everyday life of this age but has made wealth its God, a preaching wich finally becomes stronger in the course of the uprising and sets the basic tone even of the most liberal bourgeois leader's speech, means for the listener's deepest instinct that after the return of order not a new meaningful, joyous existence will begin and misery really end — for this would need no terror for its satisfaction — but the return to hard work, low pay, and actual subjugation and impotence toward those who have to make no sacrifices in order to be honest. The equality which the individuals of the mass feel to be just at such moments, and which they demand, is then the general austerity of a scanty life, which is so emphatically praised to them. If pleasure, or rather the capacity for pleasure, which they had to fight in themselves since their youth, is so ruinous, then those who embody this vice and remind one of it in their whole being, in appearance, clothing and attitude shoud also be extinguished so that the scandal disappears and one's own renunciation is confirmed. For the whole life of each of these individuals of the mass would have to appear wrong to himself, if it turned out that pleasure is really worthwhile and the halo of renunciation

136. Nietzsche's critique of "European nihilism" amounts untimately to the denial of cultural development since the beginning of Christianity. The nihilism spoken of in this article is more narrowly defined. It regards the secret self-contempt of the individual on the basis of the contrradiction between bourgeois ideology and reality. This self-contempt is usually linked with an exaggerated consciousness of freedom and of one's own or another's greatness. Because Nietzsche understands the term too widely and therefore unhistorically, he cannot understand that nihilism is overcome either by society as a whole or not at all. "We have grown to dislike egoism," he complains in *The Will to Power (Complete Works* [New York, 1964], Vol. 14, p. 11). But what he intentionally promotes is, however, merely the abstract self-consciousness of ancient slave holders, and unintentionally, the good conscience of modern tyrants who reproduce the general nihilism which they carry in themselves.

exists only in the imagination. Through the clumsy and frenzied attempts to grab whatever is possible, through the imitation of orgies as he imagines them, the little man who has one day come to power documents the same inner fear as the idiosyncratically virtuous parvenu, of missing the chance of his lifetime. For it is always a question of the soul. Driven by serious curiosity and inextinguishable hatred, people seek the forbidden behind what is alien to them, behind every door which they cannot enter,in innocent associations and sects, monastery walls and palaces. The concept of the alien becomes synonymous with that of the forbidden and dangerous, and the enmity is all the more fatal since its carriers feel that this forbidden thing is irretrievably lost for themselves by virtue of their own rigid character. Petit-bourgeois resentment against the nobility and anti-Semitism have similar psychic functions. Behind the hatred of the courtesan, the contempt for aristocratic existence, the rage over Jewish immorality, over Epicureanism and materialism is hidden a deep erotic resentment which demands the death of their representatives. They must be wiped out, if possible with torments, for the meaning of one's own existence is called into question every moment by the others. In the orgies of the aristocracy, the community of wives in rebellious cities, the bloodthirstiness of the followers of an opposed religion — in such deeds imputed to their victims —virtue betrays its own dream. It is not so much the seldomness of luxury that sets the ideologically-dominated mass in motion as the very possibility of luxury to exist. Luxury is therefore essentially considered impertinent not because there is poverty, but because poverty is considered better than it. That all are equally nothing and are reduced to it as soon as they believe to be more — this brutality toward the personal destiny, which brutality is in the bourgeois world the law for most, is presented before everyone's eyes by the guillotine and moreover gives the masses the blissful feeling of omnipotence since its own principle attains power. The guillotine symbolizes negative equality, this worst democracy, which is identical with its own opposite, the complete contempt for the person. Accordingly, a typical kind of treatment in the prisons and tribunals of the bourgeois freedom-movements and counter-revolutions is cruelty accompanied by moral abuse, castigation, and insult of the suspects. Equalization has two meanings: to bring up what is below, to set the highest claim to happiness consciously as the standard of society, or to drag down, to cancel happiness, to bring everything down to the level of the present misery of the masses. Even the liberating movements decisive for mankind in this era have something of this second meaning. Both principles are at work in the masses, and often enough they conflict. Although in the counter-revolutions only the negative one becomes reality, the positive one, which points beyond the structure of the epoch, also has determined the essence of some historical phenomena.

Nonetheless, one need not read Taine's descriptions, inspired by wild enmity,[137] to recognize this nihilism even in the terror of the French Revolu-

137. Cf. Hippolyte Taine, *Les origines de la France contemporaine,* Vol. III, (Paris, 1881) p. 294ff; also Vol. IV, p. 276ff.

tion. The "philosophical policeman Dutard," whom Mathiez quotes, expresses the function of terror for the masses more clearly than can the juxtaposition of terrible incidents. His report on the execution of twelve condemned men says: "I must tell you that these executions have the greatest effect in politics, but the most important one consists in calming the people's resentment for the evils they have borne. They exercise their revenge in this way. The wife who has lost her husband, the father who has lost his son, the merchant who no longer has a business, the worker who pays so much for everything that his wage is reduced almost to nothing, can be reconciled with the evils that oppress them only when they see people who are even more unhappy than they are and whom they believe to be enemies."[138] Marx and Engels did not overlook the contemptible side of terror in the French Revolution. "The whole French terrorism," they wrote in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, "was nothing but a plebeian manner of getting even with the enemies of the bourgeoisie: absolutism, feudalism, philistinism."[139] And in the year 1870 Engels writes: "*La terreur*, i.e., mostly useless cruelties, are committed by people who are afraid themselves, for their reassurance. I am convinced that the guilt for the reign of terror in the year 1793 falls almost exclusively on the overfrightened bourgeois acting like patriots, on the small...philistine bourgeois and the ragged, rascally mob that profited from terror."[140] When Engels here understands terror mainly as a ridiculous exaggeration of the rational goal, his revulsion for the petit-bourgeois and ragged mob also points to the socially-conditioned sado-masochistic constitution of these strata, who were no less to blame for French terror than the opponents' activity.

In view of the indefinite postponement of a really thorough and lasting improvement for the poor and the certainty that the real inequality will continue despite the empty phrase "equality," the leaders discovered the right step and offered the masses the unhappiness of each in place of the happiness of all. The beautiful Claire Lacombe, since the August 10th revolt, in which she had distinguished herself, played a certain role in the Revolution. She was closely affiliated with the radical leftists and had decisive influence on revolutionary women. When she came into conflict with Robespierre and his followers, the execution was announced even before her final arrest with the words: "The woman or girl Lacombe is finally in prison and made incapable of doing harm; this bacchantic counter-revolutionary now drinks nothing but water; it is known that she loved wine very much, that she no less liked good food and men; proof: the intimate friendship between her, Jacques Roux, Leclerc and comrades."[141] Robespierre generally represented this petit-bourgeois spirit in his policies. Personally, he was disposed to it by his ascetic predisposition, but the great progressive significance of the Revolution is also

138. A. Mathiez, *La Révolution française*, Vol. III (Paris, 1928) p. 81.

139. "Bilanz der preussischen Revolution", in *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von K. Marx und F. Engels*, ed. by F. Mehring, Vol. III (Stuttgart, 1920) p. 211.

140. Engels to Marx. Letter dated 4.9.1870, in *Marx/Engels Briefwechsel* Vol. IV, (Berlin, 1931) p. 377.

141. A. Mathiez, *La vie chère....*, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

expressed in his character. "The people," he writes in his notes,[142] "what obstacle stands in the way of instructing them? Misery. When will the people, then, be enlightened? When it will have bread, and the rich as well as the government stop buying base pens and tongues to deceive it. When their interest has fused with the people's. When will their interest have fused with the people's? Never." But these sentences actually went beyond the movement he led. He crossed them out in his manuscript. Similarly Saint-Just had arrived at a great insight. "Happiness is a new idea in Europe."[143] He expressed it in connection with the laws which conditioned the fall of his government. After Thermidor, not happiness, but lawless, unrestricted terror was put on the daily agenda.

The analysis of the psychic mechanisms by which hatred and cruelty are generated was begun in modern psychology mainly by Freud. The conceptual apparatus which he created in his early works, can render important services in understading these processes. His original theory shows that social prohibitions in the family and in the general social conditions are suited to keep man at a sadistic drive-level or to cast him back to it. His doctrine of partial drives, of repressions, the concept of ambivalence adopted from Bleuler and so on, are the precondition for a psychological understanding of the process under discussion here, although this application is not found in details in Freud.[144] The transformation of psychic energies that takes place in internalization cannot be understood today without the psychoanalytical perspective. Whereas, however, the Freudian categories originally displayed a dialectical character, since they related to the construction of the individual destiny in society and reflected the interaction between external and internal factors, in later years the historical element in his conceptualization retreated in favor of the purely biological. Today it seems as if that dialectical character of theory had entered into the early works too independently of the positivistically oriented author's will. The more he approaches more comprehensive sociological, historical or philosophical problems, the more clearly the liberal and world-view trait of his thinking comes to the fore. From his theory of narcissism it already follows that love needs more explanation than hatred. Hate, as a relation to objects, is older than love. It derives from the narissistic ego's primeval repudiation of the external world with its outpouring of stimuli."[145] Later the destruction-drive was set as the inborn human inclination to 'badness,' to aggressiveness and destructiveness, and so to cruelty as well!"[146] as a directly, biologically determined basic fact of psychic life. Freud assumes that

142. J. Jaures, *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution francaise*, Vol. VIII (Paris, 1924) p. 259.

143. Saint-Just, *Oeuvres completes,* Vol. II (Paris, 1908) p. 248.

144. A theoretically important continuation within psychoanalysis comes from Wilhelm Reich. Cf. especially *Mass Psychology of Fascism.* I agree on many points with his psychological interpretation of individual traits of the bourgeois character. Reich, however, remains a true disciple of Freud's by deriving them essentially from sexual repression; he ascribes an almost utopian significance in the changing of the present conditions to the de-inhibition of genital sexuality.

145. Sigmund Freud, *"Instincts and their Vicissitudes" in Complete Psychological Works* (London, 1962), Vol. 14, p. 139.

146. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents,* in, *op. cit.,* Vol. 21, p. 170.

"besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to join it into ever greater units, there must exist another, contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to bring them back to their primeval, inorganic state. That is to say, as well as Eros, there was an instinct of death."[147] The "meaning of cultural development" is the "struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species."[148] Freud's simple philosophy of history follows from this general schema. As a result of "this primary mutual hostility of human beings,"[149] cultural society is constantly threatened with disintegration, and a lasting improvement of social conditions is impossible. All kinds of coercion, laws, morality and religion, are attempts to counter the effects of the eternal destruction drive. An "elite" will always be needed to hold in check the destruction-prone masses. In history we get the impression that "the idealistic motives served only as an excuse for the destructive appetites; and sometimes — in the case, for instance, of the cruelties of the Inquisition — it seems as though the idealistic motives had pushed themselves forward in consciousness, while the destructive ones lent them an unconscious reinforcement. Both may be true."[150] It is certain, in any case, "that there is no question of getting rid entirely of human aggressive impulses."[151] Although, according to Freud, the life of certain primitive tribes and the teaching of the Bolsheviks seemed to confirm such Utopian ideas, he however persists in his scepticism. "That, in my opinion, is an illusion."[152] One should, especially, not think that war can so soon be abolished. The culturability, i.e. "man's personal capacity for the transformation of the egoistic impulses under the influence of eroticism,"[153] consists of "two parts, one innate and the other acquired in the course of life."[154] We are inclined to overestimate the innate one, and the acquired one is generally held of little account. Most men are "hypocrites" as regards their cultivation. Freud explains the cruelty expressed in war, and not only in war, by a transformation of drive-impulses that seek material goals, ultimately by the coercion to patiently endure misery. He is inclined to understand the "pressure of culture," insofar as it does not concern sexuality, as pressure on the innate destruction-drive instead of on all needs which the masses must repress contrary to the social possibilities. Like the devil in the Middle Ages, the eternal destruction-drive is supposedly to blame for all evil. Freud, moreover, considers himself especially daring with this view. "We should probably have met with little resistance," he writes as explanation for psychoanalysis's long hesitation to accept the death-drive into its teaching,[155]

147. *Ibid.*, p. 118f.
148. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
150. Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" in *op. cit.*, Vol. 22, p. 210.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
152. *Ibid.*
153. Freud, "Thoughts on War and Death" in, *op. cit.*, Vol. 14, p. 282.
154. *Ibid.*
155. Sigmund Freud, "New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis" in *op. cit.*, Vol. 22, pp. 103-04.

"if we had wanted to ascribe an instinct with such an aim to animals. But to include it in the human constitution seems sacrilegious; it contradicts too many religious presumptions and social conventions." He does not know how much this new phase of his doctrine and movement merely repeats the social and religious convention.

The historical phenomena we were speaking of above should confirm the view that the enmity to pleasure contained in the modern age's optimistic and pessimistic conception of man stems from the social situation of the bourgeoisie. The over-tense model of man, the both sentimental and hard concept of virtue and self-surrender, the cult of an abstract heroism have the same root as individualistic egoism and nihilism, which they simultaneously contradict and interact with. The overcoming of this morality lies not in the positing of a better one, but in the creation of conditions under which their reason for existing is eliminated. The realization of morality, of a state of society and individuals worthy of man, is not a merely psychological, but a historical problem. By this insight Hegel led idealism out beyond its original boundaries. Freedom is "first just a concept, the principle of mind and heart," but it is destined "to develop into objectivity..."[156] To a father's question on the best way to educate his son morally, a Pythagorean answered (it is also attributed to others): "If you make him a citizen of a state with good laws."[157] Thus the problem is not solely an internal one. It is at present also not a matter of good orientation and skillful selection. Whether future generations will live a life worthy of man depends on the outcome of a period of struggles whose relevance Hegel could not yet see from his own standpoint. When Freud mocks, however, that in certain people's view, man's brutality, violence, cruelty are merely temporary and provoked by the circumstances, indeed are "perhaps only consequences of the inexpedient social regulations which he has hitherto imposed on himself,"[158] he is summing up a dialectical theory in all too shallow words, but even in the pragmatic translation this view, which meets with strong opposition, corresponds to the present condition better than the biologistic metaphysics Freud subscribes to.

In no phenomenon does the relation between ruthlessness and idealistic morality come out more pregnantly than in the juxtaposition of most tender, innocent and good-natured consideration and cynical hardness which is peculiar not just to the individual who wins power but also to the ideal and fantasy figures of this era. At home the owners of huge fortunes and the politicians whose business entails a terrible ruthlessness are usually sensitive and warm-hearted people. The role of children has already been mentioned. The most gruesome day's work is framed within friendship and a smile to a child. The lower the socially weak must bend, the higher the symbol of the naturally weak, children and venerable old men, rises. In European society the impeded development of intelligence and instincts has manifested itself in

156. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, 3rd ed. § 482; 2nd ed., §483.
157. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, § 153.
158. Sigmund Freud, "New Introductory Lectures", *op. cit.*, p. 104.

blindness to the existence of animals. Their fate in our civilization reflects the entire coldness and callousness of the predominant human type. When individuals, however, resort to especially bloody means, they have generally if not discovered, at least asserted, their love for animals. "You call me cruel, although I can't stand to watch an insect suffer," says Marat, as he recommends the killing of a series of political opponents.[159] Sentimental love for animals is one of the ideological institutions in this society. It is not a universal solidarity which naturally encompasses these living creatures but rather an alibi vis-à-vis one's own narcissism and public consciousness, a sort of test to check one's acceptance of the ideal morality. The advocacy of cruelty, the admission of enjoying the cruelty one commits, would contradict completely the necessary mood of this age. A government, among whose most important instruments used each day is that terror in a negative sense, which offers these most terrible sacrifices to the nihilistic disposition of its own followers and shows a calculated indulgence toward their spontaneous activation, would abolish itself if it were to admit this. It seeks to deny nothing more strongly than the enthusiastic function of cruelty. Indeed, it has long been a foremost trait of the business of terror to trivialize or completely deny it. Calvin praised the mildness of the Geneva city-council when they were torturing his opponents at his request, and he suppressed the tortures in a report meant for the indignant city of Zürich.[161] Voices are heard that in terrorized Geneva "incredible calm" and "harmony among all the good"[162] prevail, and those announcements to the outside world had "no further effects."[163] — "The judge is a sublimated executioner," Nietzsche says.[164] If that is true, then the state of affairs would give way if the judge really became conscious of it. Freud says rightly that the destruction-drive for cultural reasons always needs a pretext, a rationalization — the wickedness of the opponent, pedagogical purposefulness, the defense of honor, a war, or some popular uprising. Yet this rationalization does not counteract the destruction of all human community in general, but only the present one. The destruction-drive considered eternal was till now always reproduced out of social conditions and also held in check with the help of ideological practices. Under changed circumstances the effectiveness and knowledge of common interest could determine the social relations of men; the "destruction-drive" will no longer disrupt them. In the present epoch egoism has actually become destructive, both the fettered and the diverted egoism of the masses as well as the archaic egoistic principle of the economy, which still shows only its most brutal side. When the latter is overcome, the former can become productive in a new sense. The badness of egoism lies not in itself, but in the historical situation; if it is changed, then its

159. Quoted after H. Cunow, *Die Parteien der grossen französischen Revolution und ihre Presse* (Berlin, 1912) p. 334.
160. Cf. Kampschulte, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 268.
161. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
162. *Ibid.*
163. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
164. Nietzsche, *op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 205.

concept transfers to that of the more rational society.

Since the practical and theoretical solution of anthropological questions can be achieved only by the progress of society itself, and since the real constitution of bourgeois man only becomes completely clear when he has changed, no philosophy and no skilled educational methods deal adequately with the problem. The idealistic morality which prevents insight should not be rejected but historically realized, and therefore cannot be eliminated even today. The question of how the fate of the universally outlawed egoism, of the "destruction-and death-drive," would be shaped in a more rational reality finds no particular answer. But in recent times there have been signs pointing in one and the same direction for a solution. Some thinkers have, in contrast with the prevailing mentality, neither concealed, nor minimalized, nor accused egoism, but professed it: not that abstract and pitiful fiction, as it appears in some national economists and in Bentham, but pleasure, the highest degree of happiness, which also includes the satisfaction of cruel emotions. They have idealized none of the drives given to them historically as primary, but have stigmatized the distortion of the drives caused by the official ideology. These thinkers, since Aristippus and Epicurus, have in modern history been understood essentially only according to their opposition to the prevailing morality. They were defended or condemned in terms of this. But there is a peculiar fact about these apologetes of unrestricted egoism. When they traced down the condemned drives and raised them to consciousness without rejection or minimalization, these powers lost their demonic power.

These hedonistic psychologists were as a rule portrayed as the enemies of mankind, or praised sky high by the latter. This happened most to Nietzsche. The superman, the problematic concept with which the psychologist left the analytical area he had mastered, has been interpreted according to the philistine bourgeois' wish-dream, and Nietzsche himself mistaken for it. The adventurous element seemed so nice. Greatness, blood and danger were always well appreciated in pictures and monuments. But Nietzsche is the opposite of this inflated sense of power. His error lies in the present's lack of historical understanding, which leads him to bizarre hypotheses where clear theoretical knowledge was possible. He was blind to the historical dynamics of his time and hence to the way to his goal; therefore, even his most magnificent analysis, the genealogy of morals and of Christianity, despite all delicate subtlety, turns out to be too crude. But this prophet of Epicurean gods and of the pleasureableness of cruelty freed himself from the coercion to rationalize. When the will to cause suffering ceases to act "in the name" of "God," "in the name of" justice, morality, honor, or the nation, it loses, by means of self-knowledge, the terrible power it exercises as long as it is hidden by its own carrier because of an ideological denial. It is taken up into the economy of real-life conduct for what it is and becomes rationally masterable. Not the abolition of ideology and its basis, i.e., the transition to a better society, but the unleashing of aggression which is presently reproduced and repressed for social reasons by the bourgeois authorities themselves, for example in war

and national mobilization, makes it a culturally destructive power. Nietzsche himself cannot be pictured as an executioner like some of his disciples. His inoffensive existence stems from perhaps the deepest knowledge of psychic connections that has ever existed in history. Nietzsche's precursors in the analysis of egoism and cruelty, Mandeville, Helvétius, de Sade, are as free as himself from Freud's condescending tolerance toward the destruction-drive which "unfortunately" happens to exist, and of his resigned scepticism as they are of the loving Rousseau's *ressentiment*.

By their own existence these psychologists seem to point out that the liberation from ascetic morality with its nihilistic consequences can bring about a human change in the opposite sense than internalization. This process, which abolishes it, does not cast man back to the previous, psychic stage, as it were, as if that first process had never taken place, but brings it to a higher form of life. But those thinkers have contributed little to making it a universal reality; that is mainly the task of the historical persons in whom theory and historical practice became a unity. In them the mechanisms of bourgeois psychology, both as determining forces of their life and as theoretical object, are less important than their world-historical mission. Insofar as mankind, with their help, enters a higher era, it will change reality and quickly acquire the freer psychic constitution such as the great number of strugglers and martyrs for that general transformation already have without psychological mediation, because the dark, happiness-denying ethos of a dying epoch no longer has any power over them.

According to Aristotle's aesthetic theory, the sight of suffering in tragedy causes pleasure.[165] Men become purer by satisfying this drive, the pleasure in empathy. The application of Aristotle's theory to the modern age seems to be problematic, it has been reinterpreted and "moralized," even by Lessing, in the sense of idealistic morality. Catharsis by drama, by play in general, presupposes a changed humanity.

165. Cf. Chap. 6 of *Poetik*..