The Relation between Psychology and Sociology in the Work of Wilhelm Dilthey.

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To embark upon a discussion of Dilthey is at best an audacious undertaking. The subject-matter which interests us in this study is not to be found in any single definitive work. The great biographies of Schleiermacher or of the young Hegel take up specific themes which do not bear upon the problem with which we are here concerned. German philosophers are traditionally blamed for dealing with comprehensive abstract problems which are difficult to understand. Dilthey not only has this fault, but an added one: the decisive parts of his work are incomplete. His writings, in spite of their impressive range, are composed of fragments, drafts and notes, most of which were published posthumously. Personally, I do not consider this lack of system for which Scheler, for instance, reproached him, as something merely negative. The fact that Dilthey never found a final solution for the decisive problems with which he dealt, that, instead, he started over and over again, and that he spurned, through the formulation of a system, to pretend to a clarity which does not exist in these matters, gives to the study of Dilthey, even today, a stimulating character and at the same time a certain diffuse quality.

It is difficult to place Dilthey in any of the branches of the traditional sciences.

He would have rejected the title of "philosopher of history" in any metaphysical sense. He always felt himself to be a disciple of the Enlightenment which identified knowledge with science and opposed it to speculation. Science, according to Dilthey, is based on analysis. The aim of the analysis is "to find the real factors through the dissection of the reality" (V. 174),[1]) and the analytical tools are induction and experiment. Though, like Windelband and Rickert, he stresses the methodological distinction between the natural and the cultural sciences, he takes great care to preserve the cultural sciences from dogmatism. The propositions which theoretical thought arrives at are, according to him, not unconditionally true, but are only hy-

[1]) The roman numerals refer to the volumes and the arabic numerals to the page numbers of Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften*, Leipzig and Berlin, 1922/36.

potheses. His problems, however much they derive from the Hegelian sphere of thinking, are in a somewhat anxious way assimilated to the positivist methodology. Ranke's desire to see things as they really have been is supplemented by Dilthey's insistence that mere observation and verification is not sufficient, but that knowledge of "historical-social reality" (I, 95) must be based on the application of all the special theories of man and of science which are at our disposal. It is true that these are only auxiliary theories. The aim is universal history as the culmination of the whole of the cultural sciences (humanities). Dilthey, in spite of all his polemics against Comte, nevertheless patterned this progress from the "simple" to the "more complex" (I, 94) too much after the model of the natural sciences.

Dilthey repeatedly fought against any transcending of experience. For instance, the question whether the aim of the individual lies in himself, whether the value of life is realized in the existence of the individual, or rather in the development of a nation or of mankind in general, is for him a question of mere metaphysics (VII, 284). He shows himself to be a genuine member of Max Weber's generation and, moreover, a follower of the philosophy of recent centuries, by stressing the importance of clearly separating knowledge from purpose, practice from theory, thought from conviction. To be sure, in the last years of his life, under the influence of phenomenology, he seems to have freed himself from this more narrowing than liberating attitude. In his later fragments we find discussions of the objectivity of values. Dilthey did not, however, draw the conclusions which would have brought into clear view his inherent opposition to a science free from value judgments *(wertfreie Wissenschaft)* (VI, 317, VII, 63 sq.).

Dilthey did not want to be a philosopher of history, neither did he want to be a sociologist. The attack on sociology in the "*Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*" (Introduction to the cultural sciences) is perhaps the best known part of his theoretical writing. By sociology, he understands mainly the school of Comte. If the philosophy of history takes upon itself the impossible task of furnishing a unified theory of the whole of historical reality (that is to say a theory derived from a principle rather than from the gathering together of manifold results of scientific analysis), sociology goes even beyond this program in its attempt to use so pompous a theory for the future practical construction of society. Dilthey criticizes Comte and his school especially for their assumption of a universal law of human development, and for the grandiose way in which Comte's sociology would generalize more or less vague analogies between the historical

periods. Dilthey thoroughly detested the practice of "subsuming the method of studying cultural facts under the methods of the natural sciences" (I, 105).

That Dilthey does not discriminate between the philosophy of history and sociology is not quite so arbitrary as it may appear. He rejects in both of them the concept of a unified theory of history. This idea originates in the work of St. Simon. St. Simon discovered in the French Revolution that the forms of government and constitutions may change without any basic change taking place in social life. (Cf. *Oeuvres*, Paris 1865/78, Vol. XIX, pp. 81-83). The laws which regulate political relations are based, according to St. Simon, on the particular form of production and of property. Society is the ever changing relation of men, conditioned by production and property relations. What Dilthey is attacking is the notion that one can relate everything in the history of mankind in such a unity that the whole development in the economic, political, legal, artistic, and religious spheres can be composed into one science. Dilthey attacked the idea that sociology is a unified theory of history, an idea which runs through the nineteenth century ever since St. Simon gave expression to it. He pronounces it metaphysical. A science of the manifold relations and associations of men, like subordination, imitation, division of labor, competition, the perpetuation of social groups, the formation of hierarchies, of parties, and so on (see I, 421), a science of relations which in the historical change of their content and aims remain constant, that is, a formal general sociology, such a science Dilthey recognized. He turns against St. Simon, Hegel and Marx, but not against Simmel.

Society is for Dilthey no inner unity but the sum total of external forms of organization. But this sum total must be deduced from psychic factors. Thus Dilthey thinks of all the conscious and unconscious tendencies of domination and dependence, freedom, compulsion, etc. Society is therefore not to be conceived as an independent entity of its own; it can be understood only by reference to psychic phenomena. Any given society exists only insofar as the various sides of human nature find expression in it. Approaching culture from an exclusively psychological point of view, Dilthey can be called an extreme individualist. "If one could imagine a single individual wandering about the earth, he would develop for himself, in complete isolation, all these functions (philosophy, religion, art) if he lived long enough." The only realities are the individuals who make up society and the integrating forms which they exhibit. The individual and his powers,—that is to say, man—are not to be ex-

plained in terms of society. On the contrary, society is to be explained in terms of man and his eternal gifts. But in every period of history man presents himself in a new aspect, instilling his specific soul into each of the great epochs of humanity.

The reader will have undoubtedly realized by now that, despite the increasing emphasis on his positivistic position, despite his underscoring of facts and his denunciation of metaphysics, Dilthey has at least as much in common with Hegel as with Gibbon or Buckle. One might say that it was his historical task to try to realize, with the tools of the most advanced scientivism and modern positivism, the great tradition of classical German idealism, the idea that psychic structures express themselves in history, that cultures are divided and separated from one another yet possess an inner connection, that history is to be understood (Hegel would have said grasped) and not merely narrated. Dilthey shared Hegel's urge never to remain on the level of the external and superficial. He strove to draw a distinction between appearance and reality, secretly, so to speak, and without being able to reconcile it with his theory of knowledge which was so closely allied with positivism. Dilthey's numerous historical and methodological works constitute an effort to see history in its various provinces as an expression of man's essence. Just as Kant saw the activity of the knowing subject operate with his transcendental factors in the system of mathematical natural sciences, Dilthey sees man presenting himself in actual history, in the manifestations of politics, art, and religion. He aimed at a critique of historical reason. However, it is not when we examine ourselves, it is not by introspection, nor, as Dilthey once said, by brooding, that we arrive at what we are, but by an analysis of historical reality. Dilthey would have us study the social and historical world not for some assigned practical end, nor arbitrarily and without direction, but in order to experience what we ourselves are, in order to know ourselves. It is in this sense that he is the true follower of the idealists.

Let us consider, for a little longer, Dilthey's conception of the difference between natural and cultural sciences. The natural sciences are engaged in a systematic determination and classification of the facts given by sense perception in their space-time relationships. Cultural sciences have to deal with the same objects. Reality is not divided into nature on the one hand, and mind on the other. Cultural sciences have to deal with the same reality under another specific aspect. Certain objects in nature compel us to regard them as the expression of life past or present, and we are able to know their true character from an understanding of what we ourselves are. We

must go back from them to our own life. That does not mean that we can learn nothing new from a knowledge of other beings, for if we could not, mere introspection would enable us to get at ourselves, and the study of history would be unnecessary. The examination of other living beings, of other epochs and cultures, tends to illuminate certain structures and tendencies within ourselves which we should not have been aware of otherwise. An investigation of the historical world reveals structures which are working in us and which we see reflected in objective reality. This most complicated—and, in Dilthey's writings, very highly differentiated—process of an interplay between consideration of the external psychic reality and the experience of our own personal life is the process of "understanding" *(Verstehen)*, by which the cultural sciences are differentiated from the natural sciences.

The understanding does not consider objects according to the relationship between cause and effect (as in the natural sciences), but between external and internal, whole and part. The objects of understanding are grasped only when they are conceived as the expression of human existence and placed in the context of the existence living in and with them. As Dilthey phrases it, the object must be "re-translated" in the life-relationships of the subject; it must be understood as an "objectivization of life" (historical documents, social institutions, works of art, and so forth, are explicable only through such re-translations).

The life relationship in turn can only be experienced *(erlebt)*. It must be immediately present to the subject in its totality. Only then is it possible to comprehend the parts from the whole. That does not mean that this whole is to be arrived at only by mystical intuition. Dilthey insisted that a basic scientific analysis of all individual data and relationships must precede understanding. But this analysis must always have the whole before it, the totality which operates in every individual datum, and it must integrate every individual phenomenon in this whole, for there alone does it have its truth.

The arguments which are immediately raised against Dilthey's notion of the understanding are easy to see. They lie ready to hand. If Dilthey is right, a large part of our knowledge depends upon the inner richness of the individual, who strives for such knowledge. The act of knowing, in Dilthey's own words, comes close to the artistic process. In this case not a few modern methodologists would strike this whole section of knowledge from the realm of science and assign it to poetry, somewhat after the fashion of the logical empiricists. In economics they would like us to limit ourselves to mathematics, in

human psychology to experiments with the tachystoscope or similar apparatus. But if these critics are right, a sphere of decisive experience would thus fall outside the range of scientific activity.

Dilthey's conception of the understanding does not become clear until it is realized that he is dealing with the method of history. It is not so much a matter of how we understand men or animals in their everyday surroundings, but of how we understand history. And history does not speak to us so much through the living being as through the fragments of past cultures, through their philosophy, religion, poetry, and plastic arts. Dilthey's work is concerned primarily with the great philosophical and theological achievements of the Renaissance and Reformation, of classical German idealism, of the poets and musicians of that era. Understanding becomes hermeneutics, the interpretation of historical documents. Schleiermacher, with whom Dilthey was concerned again and again throughout his life and who was in many ways Dilthey's master, was the first to systematize the philosophical and other methods of historical understanding under the heading of hermeneutics. Heidegger then took the problem over from Dilthey. According to Heidegger, a true ontology is nothing but an understanding or interpretation of existence, in a sense, to be sure, which has nothing to do with universal history and which is limited to a monadologically conceived existence.

From what has been mentioned in previous sections, one might be tempted to bring Dilthey much too close to Bergson. Bergson, too, taught that we know ourselves by a proper understanding of reality. The "*durée*," the "*élan vital*," flows in us as in all beings. It is one and the same life which finds expression in all living beings, in nature as a whole. We know the universe when we know ourselves, and vice versa. But whereas Bergson described the omnipresent stream of life in the most general terms—one need only think of his continuity of a qualitative succession, of the presence of the whole in every moment, of the advance of the past into the future, of the creative becoming, and so forth—knowledge of man or of life is for Dilthey the product of a methodical application of all the available sciences to the historically given material. But for Bergson the stream of life is always accessible; it can be revealed in all its fullness at any moment by the act of metaphysical intuition. For Dilthey, on the other hand, the knowledge of historical life is the goal and end of all science. And here he presents his claims on psychology.

Traditional psychology has failed in historical analysis. Studies of human life in its various cultural products lose little if they are not intimately acquainted with the results of traditional psychology. It is, of course, very important to obtain valid insight into those

psychic structures which are to be found wherever psychic life itself exists. But the construction of the soul out of elements of consciousness, as was attempted in the textbooks on experimental psychology of Dilthey's day, cannot contribute to the process of understanding which really matters in the hermeneutics of history. According to Dilthey, psychology attempts "to develop a complete and transparent knowledge of psychic phenomena from a limited number of unequivocally defined elements" (V, 139). Among these elements we must count sensations, reflections, and feelings. Life appears as a mechanical combination of ultimate units. Dilthey calls such psychology explanatory or constructive psychology, the chief representatives being the associationalist psychologists, and Spencer and Taine. He attacks psychology not simply because it makes use of hypotheses but because it begins with them. Hence the cultural sciences which look to psychology for their foundation would depend on something uncertain, namely, on the weak assumption that the psyche is an accumulation of fixed elements held together by a tie of associations. Dilthey wants us to break away from a conception of the psyche which derives from a false analogy with the natural sciences. Psychology as the very basis of the cultural sciences must start from the concreteness of life, as presented to each of us in inner experience. The knowledge of ourselves has as its object not only the stream of perceptions, as psychic reality appeared to Hume or Berkeley, but the structural whole, "*Strukturzusammenhang.*" This is the main concept of Dilthey's psychology and it needs some further consideration. He calls it "the articulated totality of the psychic life." (V, 176). The description and analysis of such a "*Strukturzusammenhang*" insofar as it is typical, that is, insofar as it occurs basically in every human being, was for Dilthey the task of the psychology of the future, of descriptive and analytical psychology *(beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie)*.

Let us omit the problems arising from the concepts of proper and alien experience, givenness, type, etc., and confine ourselves to a few examples of what is meant by structural totality. In every second of our conscious life, there is not merely one sensation or one desire present, but a psychic whole. For such structural totalities Dilthey offers the example of the contemplation of a beautiful landscape (V, 203/4). As soon as we reflect, we see that not only is the sensation "given" to us, but that its successive aspects are guided by our attention and will. The whole might be permeated by a feeling of happiness or sadness. There is, here, a meaningful interweaving between sense perceptions, attention and feeling. It is a matter of "different aspects" of one and the same act—the contemplation of a

landscape—which interpenetrate. This totality is experienced; it is not theoretically derived or constructed.

Another example is offered by the process of weighing various courses of action until one reaches a practical decision. Here it is a matter of an inner succession of conditions, in which images, feelings, and the will are interconnected. This totality, too, is experienced, not constructed.

Finally, we might cite the unified totality constituted by the perception of a sound, our consciousness of its source, and our communication of that knowledge to the persons with us.

These examples may seem somewhat strange: obscure and commonplace at the same time. It may be thought odd to construct elaborate epistemological makeshifts, striving for a "*Sinnzusammenhang*," while simply discussing a set of experiences whose unity is obvious—for instance the unity of the object in the case of the identical landscape to which all the sense perceptions, acts of attention and will, moods and feelings of the spectator are related as long as he is face to face with this specific object. But it is in analyses of that type, however poor they appear to us today, that Dilthey tried to overcome the sterility of experimental psychology which at his time had usurped the place of philosophy in European academic life. He felt that the interaction between man and nature, his activity, his tenacious effort to conserve and enrich his own life and the life of his fellowmen, as well as his efforts to destroy it (as we see it today), that our entire conscious and unconscious life could not be reduced to the, so to speak, blind, meaningless, qualitatively insufficient elements of traditional psychology.

He failed, however, to see that individual or social life cannot possibly be reconstructed by means of psychology alone, whatever the school of psychology. While criticizing the lag between our concrete knowledge of man and scientific psychology, he persisted in the latter's unfounded belief that valid insight must confine itself to the realm of the immediately given—the "*données immédiates de la conscience*" which also play so vast a role in Bergson's vitalism. His idea of "*Sinnzusammenhang*" is an attempt to determine, with insufficient means, the concrete being of man by a positivistic restriction to the "given," to the "data" of his so-called inner life, whereas this concrete unity can be understood only by transcending those limits and conceiving man as a real element of a real world. Expressing this in broader historical terms, we may say that Dilthey intended to "save" decisive insights of the great German idealism, particularly of Hegel, namely the objective, the so-to-speak worldly character of the human spirit, while abandoning at the same time the

doctrine of the supra-individual, the "absolute" character of that spirit, and replacing it by the empirical, individualistic, even monadological unity of the "sense" within the psyche of man. But the individual can never be built out of the individual himself. Dilthey's failure is the inevitable failure of reconciling the irreconcilable which is so immensely characteristic of all those German thinkers of his period who took philosophy seriously, particularly of Husserl and Lask. Hegel's philosophy of history and Berkeley's principles of human understanding cannot be combined. According to Dilthey, it is not only in human life, but in all life that we find structural totalities *(Strukturzusammenhänge)*, conditions in their differences from one another by the natural and social environment. On closer view it becomes evident that "life" adjusts itself to the environment by means of such totalities. The individual either changes the environment through practical activity, or learns to submit to it. Psychology must not detach itself from the fact that man's soul is determined by its aims, though this "purposeful" *(zweckbestimmt)* character is not "deduced from a concept of purpose outside of ourselves," but that, on the contrary, the conception of a purpose external to us stems from inner experience. (V, 215) "Purposiveness *(Zweckbestimmtheit)* is by no means an objective concept of nature, but denotes merely the structural totality experienced in the drives, the pleasure and pain of an animal or human being." (V, 210). The assumption that life is directed towards the satisfaction of impulses and towards happiness is not, for Dilthey a bare hypothesis. It can be discerned in and described by our inner experience. But it would be hypothetical, according to Dilthey, to interpret these drives in naturalistic terms of the Spencer-Darwin type, such as the law of the self-preservation of the individual and the species. (cf. V, 210).

Let us continue with the description of Dilthey's psychological doctrine. In the process of contending with his environment the individual acquires a rigid form (this, too, Dilthey calls a "structure") that is, relatively stable habits ("habitualities"), moods, values, and so on, which are not always directly given, but nevertheless play a part in every living structural totality (man and animal). On the basis of the interplay between spontaneous and acquired structures, between the character as an entity and the changing experiences, Dilthey attempts to reach a concept of "development" which is no longer restricted to the natural sciences. This concept is the psychological foundation from which Dilthey derives his method of historico-genetic presentation, as evidenced in his writings on Hegel and in his famous studies of German poets, of Lessing, Goethe, Novalis, Hölder-

lin, and Schiller.

On this interplay between man's mechanical and spontaneous psychic structures Dilthey builds his conception of man as an essentially historical being *(Geschichtlichkeit)*, a being whose essence cannot be defined in static terms. This doctrine has since become the principal ontological characteristic in German *Existenz philosophy* (Heidegger and Jaspers). As the individual grows older, the acquired structure (the character or the soul) attains an ever greater prominence over his immediate experiences. "The soul, which has created and objectivized many experiences, prevails over momentary states of mind and this independence from the changes of daily life gives the artistic productions of maturity their specially sublime character, such as Beethoven's Ninth symphony or the final act of Goethe's Faust." (V, 225).

Under the influence of Husserl's phenomenology, Dilthey strove to correct the still more or less naturalistic concept of acquired structure in terms of a more modern point of view. According to Dilthey, the acquired structure was in the last analysis connected with actual life only through the obscure mechanisms of association, reproduction, and such. Consequently, the present experience is not related to the earlier one through a mere external association, but the earlier experience is implied in the present as its "meaning" (Bedeutung or Bedeutsamkeit). The view that life is essentially historical is not made narrower by this changed formulation; it is made more precise. But the task of psychology, as the fundamental discipline of the cultural sciences, is still to derive the specific phenomenon which is the subject matter of each cultural science from the typical psychic structure in which it originates. Now the latter structure can be made visible to us at any time through "reflection" *(Selbstbesinnung)*. To quote Dilthey: "Every analysis of the phenomenon of religion necessarily meets concepts like feeling, will, dependence, liberty, motive-concepts which can be elucidated only within a psychological context. Such an analysis has to deal with structures of the psychic life, since it is in this life that the consciousness of God *(Gottesbewusstsein)* arises and gains power. . . . Similarly, Jurisprudence encounters in concepts like norm, law, responsibility, psychological structures which require a psychological analysis. It cannot possibly present the connections in which law-consciousness *(Rechtsgefühl)* arises or those in which purpose becomes effective in law without clearly understanding the typical structure of every psyche. The political sciences, which deal with the external organization of society, find in every group relation the psychic facts of community, dominance and dependence. . . . History and theory of literature and

art everywhere find themselves referred back to the basic yet compounded aesthetic feelings of the beautiful, sublime, witty or ridiculous. Without proper psychological analysis these words (religion, art, law, etc.) remain obscure and dead notions to the historian. . . . This is so, and no amount of specialization of the fields of knowledge can prevent it. Just as the systems of culture, of economy, law, religion, art and science as well as the external organization of society in the family, community, church, and state, originate from the living structure of the human psyche, so they can be understood only in terms of this structure. They contain structural totalities in themselves, because the psychic life is itself a structural totality. Throughout history the understanding of these internal psychic totalities determines the understanding of those social totalities." (V, 147-8).

The articulation of whole cultures and epochs of human history is also, according to Dilthey, understandable only if we reconstruct the way in which the individual spheres of culture are interconnected in the typical men of every epoch. We have to reconstruct the significance and the weight that religion or law or economy or science possessed for them. It is only on this basis that it is meaningful to speak of different cultures, it is only on this basis that we can establish essential historical periods, and finally sketch something like a history of mankind. The life spirit of an epoch obtains its typical expression in its great personalities, in its poets and philosophers, and for this reason, too, according to Dilthey, biography is "the most essentially philosophical form of history." (V, 225).

In conclusion it is appropriate to raise the question whether the plan of that psychology which Dilthey outlined in his "Ideas" of 1894 has attained fulfilment since that time. Let us pass over Dilthey's critique of traditional psychology which has since made headway. That critique was a general trend of the time. We need only recall Bergson and the *Gestalt* theories. Both agree that psychic life cannot be constructed from elements which are actually obtained as a result of mere abstraction. Let us also pass over the attempt to build a theory of history and society on a psychological foundation, as attempted by Pareto. Like Dilthey, Pareto built for himself a psychology which could help him in his study of society. To be sure, it is markedly different from that of Dilthey, in structure as well as in content. We shall here raise a different question, whether in spite of the opposition between the naturalistic principles of Freud and the historical principles of Dilthey, the theory of psychoanalysis does not meet some of Dilthey's requirements. For Freud, too, history is understandable only through a return to basic psychic tendencies. The same forces which determine the individual, rule the Universe.

History is a struggle between the forces that preserve and those that are hostile to human society, between the libidinous and destructive forces, between Eros and the death impulse. When Dilthey says that "Hunger, love, and war are the most powerful forces in the moral world," that "the most powerful impulses, the hunger drive, sex, and care for the young, operate in these forces" (V, 209), Freud would certainly make but slight corrections. The agreement, however, is rooted even deeper. It lies above all in the conception of a coherent totality of meaning *(Sinnzusammenhang)* in each individual existence, a totality which develops itself in the struggle between the individual being and his environment. Freud explicitly holds the view that each of our experiences has a meaning, a "sense" which derives from its interweaving with the whole structure of our life and can be correctly described only by an analysis of this totality. Freud's socio-historical studies,—for instance Totem and Taboo,—are paragons of the psychological interpretation of history. The character traits, preferences, and values of the individual develop out of the conditions and difficulties of early childhood. We abstain from passing judgment here upon the truth of Freud's various theses, the Oedipus complex, for example. In any case, these theories might be regarded as the fulfilment of Dilthey's demand that the individual life, in its typical structures, be presented as a coherent totality of meaning. The single phases of the development of impulses, namely, the oral, anal, and genital, as described in the "Three Essays on Sexual Theory" (V, 7 ff.) represent, in Freud's view, typical structures which can be found in every normal psychic life. It is not accidental that the acquired structure *(erworbener Zusammenhang)* which was established on the basis of earlier experience is, in Dilthey's view also, largely unconscious, and must be revealed only through "analysis." We do not know if Freud and Dilthey would explain the unconscious in quite different ways, but an example can be given to show that the agreement between them is not superficial. In his speech on "Poetical Fantasy and Madness," Dilthey has shown that in metaphysics, poetry and myth the same images always recur in the history of mankind. "In dream and madness, we find, with striking regularity, specific images which are always bound to sensations and internal states, pictures which interpret, explain and represent these states. They are a kind of poor, shrunken symbol, and the realm of these symbols can be scrutinized." (VI, 101). The symbols are "poor" in dream and madness, but they recur, richer and with more varied differentiations, in the great cultural achievements of mankind which are permeated by them. Dilthey's concept of the type appears here in connection with the doctrine of symbols which Freud de-

veloped in his theory of dreams and in his studies of cultural history. We note in passing that the most valuable side of Freud's theory stands in utter contradiction to his empiricist and naturalistic theory of knowledge, and, similarly, that Dilthey's doctrines contradict his positivistic opinions on the logic of science.

We should not exaggerate, however, the measure of agreement between them. At present this agreement is the more obvious because Dilthey's historic achievements, like those of his disciples and above all the biographical ones, are characterized by a tendency to a strongly individualistic psychology, a tendency which has been transformed into a caricature through the present fashion of popular biographies of great men. There is, however, another side to Dilthey's theory which recalls the Hegelian dialectic much more than it does psychoanalysis. That is his flair for what Hegel called the objective spirit *(objectiver Geist)*. There is no doubt that the categories of individual psychology are valuable for elucidating the works of the founders of religion, the achievements of statesmen, philosophers, and poets. But on the other hand it is true that an understanding of the problems of the inner laws of the cultural spheres, etc., with which they deal, will help, in no lesser degree, to clarify the psychology of these world-famous men. Without an exact knowledge of the political and religious situation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the characters of Luther and Calvin cannot be explained. The same holds good for the aesthetic problems. No one who has not reached the point where he can cope with most subtle technical details can say anything about Greco and Tintoretto even if he has a profound knowledge of neurotic symptoms visible in their work. For this reason Freud's essays—and still more those of his followers—on artists and politicians sometimes show a rather pedantic touch. Paradoxically enough, on the opposite side, the vagueness of Dilthey's psychological categories often leads to the same result. Freud's writings about art often sound like a doctor's, Dilthey's like a German high school teacher's. The difference between Freud and Dilthey may perhaps be summed up in the following way. If we compare an article by Dilthey on a poet or a musician with a study, let us say, of Freud on Leonardo da Vinci, Dilthey's psychological observations appear to us rather abstract and narrow. They appear, so to speak, more traditional than Freud's insights, which are saturated with a wider psychological experience. In Freud's analysis the connections between the work of an artist and his experiences in the decisive periods of his development are definitely established. He deals with very specific events, sexual experiences, threats and anxieties. Dilthey refers too often to abstract conceptions like expression, imagination,

impulse, will, and so forth, which he holds in common with the traditional psychology rejected by him. But Dilthey nevertheless has an inkling of what art or poetry or philosophy really is. He sees the artist in relation to the specific cultural tendencies of his time and of world history. If he speaks of a Roman he draws in Roman law and Roman imperialism as real forces in the soul of the Roman citizen. He does not speak only of his inner experience in the abstract sense of individual instincts, etc. If he discusses the old German Mythology he speaks of the life in wood and fields through thousands of years, of the lack of cities, the dependence on the seasons, etc.

If the two tendencies in his historical writing had penetrated each other as he postulated in his theory of interaction in the process of understanding, each of his studies would indeed be a section of concrete theory of history. Unfortunately, the reader of his methodological writings, (some of which we have discussed here), will be disappointed if he turns to the historical essays. We find that the historical writings largely present the history of the psychological development of a person in a manner not markedly distinguished from the biographies customary at the time. Dilthey's own postulate was that each particular investigation of a cultural subject must examine the phenomenon from three points of view which in turn are finally interdependent. First, in the "knowledge of the whole of the historical and social reality," second, in the typical structure of intellectual activity as such, and third, in the specific problematics of the respective cultural fields, whether poetry, art, or philosophy, which have their own laws of meaning *(Sinngesetze)*. (I, 88-89) This postulate, that the subjective mind can be rightly understood only in connection with the objective mind (using the Hegelian terminology), has not been fully worked out in his historical writings. In his study on Schiller, we find for instance that such problematical psychological concepts as natural gifts, will to greatness, inner purification, incessant striving, etc., play the main part. This inconsistency between tool and achievement need not, however, necessarily diminish the ingenuity of some of Dilthey's methodological investigations.