viction that the Board will be able effectively to sustain the life of the act if it sticks to the admissibility of evidence "which in the daily life of employers and employees appears to have probative force." Unfortunately, the monograph is very brief on this point.

The pamphlet dealing with the administration of the *Walsh-Healy* Act of 1936 assumes special significance today. With the growth of the national defense program the realm of the act must necessarily widen and its provisions assume a far greater importance than any other kind of minimum wage or maximum hour legislation. Adequately handled, the act may, next to the Wagner Act, become the cornerstone for the establishment of rational labor relations. The admirable monograph points out some weaknesses which may ultimately lead to making the act inoperative. The first lies in the application of the blacklist sanction, that is, the prohibition of a public contract to anyone who has been found to have violated the act, unless the Secretary of Labor specifically recommends otherwise. The blacklisting, which is far more powerful than a criminal fine or even imprisonment, creates a tremendous responsibility for the Secretary of Labor. It is thus no wonder that the sanction is applied only with great reluctance. Yet, too great a reluctance may lead to the disruption of the act. The problem will be to vest the authority of blacklisting in some administrative body with greater authority,—perhaps, as reports suggest, in some inter-departmental agency. It could certainly not be an administrative tribunal or court, since the kind of decision involved is fundamentally a matter of policy-shaping.

The second defect appears to lie in the method of field inspection. It is at this point that the trade union has to be involved and that the lack of legally recognized works councils elected by all employees becomes visible. Nothing in the act prevents the trade unions from filing a complaint, hearing witnesses, and preparing the material for the field inspector. With the increase of the number of manufacturers working for national defense, the Department of Labor will either have to increase the number of field inspectors or will have to resort to close collaboration with the trade union.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN (New York).

**Nickerson, Hoffman,** *The Armed Horde 1793-1939*. A Study of the Rise, Survival, and Decline of the Mass Army. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York 1940. (xii and 428 pp.; $4.25)

This is indeed a book with a challenge. Its very title warns the reader not to expect an unbiased analysis of modern war. Democracy and "the armed horde," the dominant form of warfare during the last century and a half, are to the author two aspects of the same sinister principle. "It is the thesis of this book that the two are inseparably connected both with each other and with a third thing, barbarism" (p. 14). Nickerson does not omit any of the invectives that have been directed against universal conscription, mass war, national war, "absolute" or "unlimited" or "total" warfare, from the days of the French revolution to the present crusade of the civilized world against Nazism and Fascism, and he improves on all of them.

At the same time, his definition of "democracy" comprises a great variety of tendencies that are not generally comprehended under this term. It in-

cludes tendencies of proletarian socialism and anarchism as well as certain behavior patterns of modern anti-democratic Nazism. Socialism he refers to as "the monstrous doctrine produced in the alien brain of Mordecai, alias Karl Marx" (pp. 228-29) and he blames the dictators for copying "the worst feature of previous democracies" (pp. 395-96). The "romantic nationalism" of the early 19th century and even the far less romantic nationalism that was later developed by the Prussian state and the new German empire of 1871 are presented as mere offshoots of revolutionary Rousseauian democracy (pp. 128-29, 236).

Thus, the whole theory of this book is based on a strangely outdated philosophy. Rousseau appears as the very arch-initiator of the horrors of modern "totalitarian" or "absolute" warfare (p. 86). There is only one period in all modern history that glitters with all the conceivable virtues. This is the pre-Rousseauian, pre-revolutionary 18th century with its "moderation and decorum," its "Augustan serenity and order," its "moral unity" and the ensuing "successful and strict limitation of war" (p. 63). It is the period of which Talleyrand said: "He who has not lived before 1789, does not know the sweetness of life." It is the period that throughout the 19th century was extolled by all masters of the counter-revolution, from De Maistre to Taine. To reach this truly halcyon epoch, humanity had to pass through the horrors of the religious wars which in some respects surpassed even the 19th century's "climax of vileness and destruction." It is the "high summit" from which afterwards "Christendom fell away" into that orgy of mass-massacre which has not ended yet.

In spite of this unconcealed bias of the author, his book is of outstanding value as a study of one of the most vital problems of our time. Since Fuller's *War and Western Civilization 1832-1932* this is the first book written with the particular purpose of studying "the interaction of social and military forms." Even though we take exception to its conclusions we still have to accept its factual content and to base our own criticism mainly on a closer observation and a different organization of the same facts.

The author's principal thesis, already implied in the title and worked out in detail through all the eight chapters of the book, concerns the historical character of "the armed horde." Mass war does not belong to all historical epochs; the author most appropriately comments on the fact that "oddly enough, our time which in most matters emphasizes changing rather than unchanged things, usually talks of war as if it changed little except for new weapons" (p. 5). Mass war in all its aspects is a historical product of the present time, "reflecting its technics, power of organization, and moral driving forces, fused into a single effort."

On the other hand, what the propagandists of both sides would make us believe, is not true. "Total war," as at present conceived, is not a brand new invention of the last ten or twenty years. It is not a peculiar expression of the Nazi movement. During the last 150 years democracy itself invented and developed all the known aspects of the so-called total war of our time. Since the Jacobin *levée en masse* of 1793, all major democratic wars in Europe and the United States have been total wars within the limits set by the currently existing degree of technical and industrial development. They have been mass wars based on conscription and on a "universal draft" of all the resources of the belligerent nations, putting all labor and all capital absolutely at the disposal of the government which in turn tended to be-

come an appendage to the High Command of the armed forces. They were virtually, and in some cases actually, "unlimited" wars in the sense first developed in practice by the armies of the *Convention* and the Napoleonic empire, and elaborated in theory by Fichte and Hegel and their disciple, the German general von Clausewitz. Furthermore, these democratic wars almost invariably originated from, or tended to culminate in, some kind of social revolution. All these statements, with the possible exception of the last, are today accepted by all historical experts. One basic feature of this kind of warfare, the principle of universal service as against professional and semi-professional long-service forces, has been acclaimed as the most democratic principle of military organization—the people in arms. Even today, the conscript armies of England and the United States resemble more closely the *levée en masse* of the revolutionary Jacobins of 1793 than does the German army, "with only a third of its strength even nominally infantry, and with much if not most of its real work done by the long-service professionals of its Tank Corps and of the German Air Force" (p. 397).

Thus far the general theory of the author, which describes the modern form of mass war as the "natural fruit" of democracy, seems to be essentially justified. Its weakness is disclosed when in the last chapters of the book he applies it to the particular phenomena of the most recent historical development. In spite of some evidence to the contrary, the main tendency of this new development of warfare is not toward a further enhancement but rather toward a gradual decline of the type of mass warfare that predominated formerly. This is manifested, among other things, by the lessening importance of the "armed horde" in the military operations of the present war, by the comparative bloodlessness of its every operation in comparison with those of twenty years ago, and by a conspicuous lack of the general enthusiasm characteristic of 1914 and '15.

There is no reason to challenge this statement of the author as long as we regard it as a mere factual description of observable phenomenological tendencies. What is wrong is his attempt to explain these observable facts, in terms of his general theory, by a final exhaustion of the democratic principles of the French revolution. The whole theory of the author appears to suffer from over-generalization. It needs a much more specific formulation in order to fit the concrete facts of the actual historical development.

First, mass warfare, even in its origin, was not a product of the French revolution in general, but of one definite phase of that revolution. It originated at the critical juncture when the rise of the *Vendée* and outside aggression had forced the replacement of the much more democratic principles of the first phase of the revolution by the authoritarian and violent measures of the revolutionary dictatorship of the Jacobins. Second, the further development of universal conscription and of all other features of the "armed horde" during the 19th century lay not so much in the hands of democratic France as in those of the anti-democratic Prussian state. This was not, as the author believes, merely historical irony, but had its foundation in the greater appropriateness of an exalted use of force and violence for the purposes of the anti-democratic counter-revolution. Third, compulsory military service was reintroduced in Germany after Versailles not by a democratic government, but by the authoritarian and anti-democratic dictatorship of Hitler. Thus total war is less the outcome of the democratic revolution than it is the weapon of the anti-democratic counter-revolution. If, nevertheless,

the present war shows—on the side of the fascist aggressors even more than on the side of the democratic defenders—a certain change of form from an unrestricted all-round offensive effort to a more deliberately controlled and, as it were, "planned" method of conducting war, the decisive reasons for this change are to be found almost exclusively in a corresponding change of the economic structure of present-day society. As already observed by Clausewitz, the total or absolute war of the beginning of the 19th century had a close structural resemblance to the then flourishing cut-throat struggles of early economy. "War," said he, "is much like business competition pushed to its logical conclusions and unrestrained by any law other than expediency." As compared to that earlier form, the war waged today by Hitler, and against him by the democracies, is not a less comprehensive and less violent, but merely a more highly rationalized, planned, and controlled form of modern war.

KARL KORSCH (Boston, Mass.).

**Bruck, W. F.,** *Social and Economic History of Germany* from William II to Hitler. 1888-1938. A Comparative Study. Oxford University Press. London and New York 1938. (291 pp.; 12 s. 6 d., $4.50)

**Stolper, Gustav,** *German Economy*, 1870-1940. Reynal & Hitchcock. New York 1940. (315 pp.; $3.00)

**Reimann Guenter,** *The Vampire Economy*. Doing Business under Fascism. The Vanguard Press. New York 1939. (350 pp.; $3.00)

**Lewis, Cleona,** *Nazi Europe and World Trade*. The Brookings Institution. Washington, D. C. 1941. (200 pp.; $2.00)

An economic history of Germany during the past fifty years is a daring undertaking for anyone to attempt in 291 pages. But when, as in Bruck, the attempt is also made to present the ideological connections that go with the economic history, the work must of necessity and at best come out as a rather sketchy affair. Furthermore, it is questionable in the extreme how far one may stress ideological ties that belong to the mercantilist period, as is done here, and yet obtain parallels to problems that have been raised in the latest period of capitalism. For example, Bruck puts the economic policy of Frederic II of Prussia under the same rubric as the T.V.A. The two policies, however, though they may from a formal point of view both be identified as policies of governmental intervention, are decisively different, as every volume of the *Acta Borussica* clearly shows. Frederic II found intervention necessary to stimulate and further privately owned manufactures, while the T.V.A. attempts to substitute public ownership in the utilities field as a means of assuring cheaper rates to the consumer.

The most interesting section consists of the author's presentation of the more recent problem of concentration and the problems of banking and industry in which he has had wide experience. The wealth of material on economic and social developments of the post-war era has quite evidently overwhelmed him, however, and instead of a concise sketch, we get among